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I. INTRODUCTION
A law review essay articulating the relationship between the
topics chosen for writing in the Harvard Law Review by law teachers
and students is worthy of attention.' Apart from the extensive
research done by the author of the essay and the interesting findings in
it, what held my interest was a certain description of space law.
Although space law as such is not included by the author as a topic,
the discipline did come to her attention, since a book review on space
law had appeared in the Review. The topic came to the essay in this
manner:
The pages of the Review revealed other historical quirks, too ....
In 1964, for example, Judge Posner ... wrote a review of a book
entitled Law and Public Order in Space, a subject that seems quaint
now. I had not created a subject for "space law," [for tabulating the
scholarly interest] of course, and I was in no mood to create
one .... After some reflection, I catalogued space as the "final
frontier" of international and comparative law-but not before
having a good laugh.2
1. Sara K. Stadler, The Bulls and Bears of Law Teaching, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 25 (2006).
2. Id. at 42.
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While perhaps being a bit short of scorn, the passage betokens the
triviality to the discipline space law. 3 The present article in no way
aims to confront the author of the essay for this assessment; instead, it
uses the triviality attributed to the discipline as a point to consider
what it is in space law that provokes laughter and the feeling that is a
quirk. Is it that space law is a less populated branch of law? Given
the fact that the number of scholars pursuing space law exceeds that of
those who pursue legal informatics or legal linguistics, such
skepticism is unfounded. The scientific nature of the activities
regulated by space law and therefore an orientation that could be
described as "less of law and more of hard science" could also be a
reason for the triviality attributed. Yet, this skepticism collapses
before the reality of the coexistence and symbiosis of science and law
in areas ranging from forensic methods to patent specifications.
However, suspicions regarding the discipline's status come to the fore
again if one considers the relatively fewer number of space law
publications in the general law reviews and journals of international
law4 as well as the dearth of public legal debates on international law.
5
3. Space law is mentioned again in a couple of footnotes; e.g., note 69 of the
essay states:
Law and Public Order in Space would have been incomplete without at
least a word on the topic of the problem of men from Mars, and the
authors of the book did not disappoint, devoting a whole chapter to the
subject. What might such men be like? The authors did not know, but they
did discuss the problem of Chinese adaptation to the realities of Western
power in the late nineteenth century. What?
Id. at n.69 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
4. Although no authoritative survey has been conducted in this area, a rough
search of Westlaw and Lexis reveals that the total number of articles (notes,
comments, and book reviews excluded) written on space law is relatively small.
There are many international law journals not yet to publish an article on space law.
The journals that used to sporadically publish research on space law are no longer
doing so. Even law journals dedicated to space law come with an "air and space"
section, which in most cases devotes seventy-five percent of its pages to
Air/Aviation Law. See, e.g., Annals of Air and Space Law, Air and Space Law,
German Journal of Air and Space Law. The only journal exclusively meant for
space law-Journal of Space Law (presently published by the National Remote
Sensing and Space Law Center of the University of Mississippi)-although inactive
for a short period from 1995 to 2003, now serves in the discipline.
5. Although space law has been discussed in the annual meetings of the
American Society of International Law as well as in the Hague Academy courses, it
has not attracted much attention from new-generation scholars.
333
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Nevertheless, space law has every bit as much academic vitality as its
counterparts-or, probably, a tad more-if measured in terms of
annual conferences, 6  summer courses organized annually,
7
international and regional epistemic forums, 8  and an annual
international moot court competition. 9 In addition, there are a few
universities that host institutes offering special space law teaching.
10
Apparently, there is some inconsistency: on one hand there is the
relative absence of the discipline from the legal mainstream, on the
other its activeness within its own ambit. The triviality of space law
seems to lie far deeper than the above-mentioned speculations suggest.
In fact, the situation warrants a detailed and methodical enquiry into
the epistemic culture of the discipline.
The article first provides a critique of the intellectual and
professional history and the prevailing epistemic culture of space law
with the aid of scholarly sensibilities, a literature review, and an
account of ideological and technological influences. It reveals that,
while active in its own ambit, space law has been sliding away from
international law-which is considered its parent discipline-and has
enclosed itself within a new set of values and norms. However, the
6. The Annual Colloquia on the Law of Outer Space organized under the
auspices of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) since 1958 are a sort of
town-meeting of the space law community. More recently, the European Center for
Space Law (ECSL) has started its own annual colloquia. In addition, the space law
wing of the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) also
organizes periodic thematic workshops.
7. The most noteworthy program of study in this regard is the ECSL Summer
Course on Space Law and Policy, held regularly since 1992.
8. The IISL and the ECSL serve as the best examples.
9. The Judge Manfred Lachs Moot Court Competition is organized annually by
the IISL alongside its annual colloquia. The competition is preceded by regional
rounds for Asia-Oceana, Europe and North America and national funding rounds in
certain Asian countries. For details, see www.spacemoot.org (last visited on Jan. 21,
2008).
10. For example, the National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center of the
University of Mississippi (United States), the Institute of Air and Space Law at
McGill University (Canada), the Institute of Air and Space Law at Cologne
University (Germany), the Institute of Air and Space Law at the University of
Lapland (Finland), and the International Institute of Air and Space Law at Leiden
University (Netherlands). A comprehensive list of universities teaching space law is
available at www.unoosa.org/docs/spacelaw/eddir/eddir.doc (last visited on Jan. 21,
2008).
4
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article does not confine itself to a critique but rather seeks to provide a
broader analytical framework for understanding the normative
characteristics of the field. To this end, the research derives two
opposing hypotheses: 1) space law ought to be where it is and as it is
and should remain separated from international law as a unique
jurisprudence; and 2) although it has its own characteristics, space law
is not a branch of law distinct from international law and there is an
imbalance in the pattern of thinking in space law that prompts one to
believe that it is separate from international law. The article
introduces selected concepts and theories of epistemology to frame a
debate in which the two hypotheses compete for justification. Within
this setting, it examines the true nature and foundation of space law.
The article serves another purpose in that it addresses the
postmodern concerns in international law centered on "fragmentation"
and the "question of self-contained regimes," topics hotly debated and
discussed among various international law groups. A surprising
amount of literature has evaluated the pros and cons of the
fragmentation of international law and verified self-contained regimes
as mere figments of the scholarly imagination. However, nearly all
such studies have taken a viewpoint that focuses on the structural
integrity of international law; hardly any studies have examined
closely the internal agitation experienced by a special branch/fragment
of international law amid the vicissitudes of postmodernity. The
article fills that gap in the literature by examining the disciplinary
mechanics of space law, in particular its reflexive response to
postmodernity. The format adopted in the article is to balance the
assumptions and beliefs of space law against those of its parent
structure, international law, yielding a neutral depiction of the
situation.
As a caveat, the article has some level of artificiality, in terms of
methodology, pooled into it. This is seen in its discourse pattern-a
critique and a debate on the critique. Even within the debate the sole
argumentator changes positions and defends each side. However, the
method has the advantage of taking the assertions to the extreme,
predicting the worst that can happen in postmodernity and presenting
the effectiveness of law's defensive mechanism in crisis.
335
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE EPISTEMIC CULTURE IN SPACE LAW
A. Advancing a New Discipline
The opening of the high frontier to human exploration occurred at
a time when the nations of the world lived in an atomistic culture
supported by certain self-centered ideologies." It was obvious that
the benefits of the new frontier would be polarized among the
superpowers at the time-the only ones who could penetrate outer
space. This accretion of power in space by two contending systems
led the rest to part with atomism and line up behind the superpowers,
creating polarized clusters in a choice driven partly by the lesser
countries' global status and partly by ideological sympathies. The
superpowers felt a certain responsibility towards the countries of the
world,' 2 yet, motivated by security and economic concerns, "claimed
for themselves the right in their discretion to exclude others [from
certain rights and] .. .impose conditions."' 3 On the other side, states
without any space capabilities claimed a right to be allocated space
resources and to the coordination of exclusive uses, if established, by
an international organization.' 4 In general, both the haves and have-
nots felt the need to have some kinds of prescriptions governing
space-related activities and to safeguard their respective interests in
space. All eyes optimistically turned towards the lawyers.
11. The ideologies that supported self-centerism are not limited to realism and
economic and political nationalism; the Soviet practice of communism was not anti-
egoistic either.
12. Myres S. McDougal and Leon Lipson capture the probable logic behind
this stance.
As the lessons of space prowess are driven home to the peoples of the
earth, the Big Two may find that they must pay not less but more attention
to the reactions and drives of the less powerful nations; that they must
redouble their coupled assurances of the possession of strength and the
resolution not to use it except under extreme provocation; that they must
pursue their quest of international support in the formal and informal fora
of world public opinion.
Myres S. McDougal & Leon Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM.
J. INT'L L. 407, 410 (1958).
13. Id. at 416.
14. See id.
6
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Lawyers were somewhat confused at the unfamiliar orientation of
the activities involved-more or less a feeling of inferiority. In
addition, "[s]ome disposition to claim priority for the physicists [was]
.. eviden[t] in certain utterances."1 5 Yet, the lawyers made studious
note of their anxieties' 6 and mutually discussed the future course of
action,' 7 all the while excusing themselves from making any final
prescriptions. 18 With the unraveling of scientific puzzles, which to
certain extent disadvantaged legal work, action became inevitable on
the part of the lawyers. Soviet President Khrushchev's facetious
assurance to the world that the U.S.S.R. had no intention of claiming
the Moon as the sixteenth Soviet socialist republic' 9 prompted a
reaction from at least American lawyers.2°
The first official U.S. legal statement pertained to three possible
issue areas-sovereignty claims, the definition of outer space, and the
right of self-defense against an armed attack from space. 2' It called
for a case-by-case approach to legal controls rather than a binding
15. Pitman B. Potter, International Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L.
304, 305 (1958).
16. See, for example, McDougal & Lipson, supra note 12; Potter, supra note
15; John C. Hogan, Legal Terminology for the Upper Regions of the Atmosphere
and for the Space Beyond the Atmosphere, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (1957); and
Wilfred Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 15 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
99 (1956).
17. See, e.g., Jean Rivoire, How to Introduce the Law into Space, 2 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 129 (1959).
18. Jenks explains the situation: "International lawyers have not been slow to
explore the challenge which the new scientific and technological developments
present for the law, but their collective thinking on the subject is necessarily in a
tentative stage of development." C. Wilfred Jenks, The International Control of
Outer Space, 3 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 3, 3 (1960). Ironically, the
physicists were disturbed by the developments in policy and noticed an erosion of
the philosophical base of physics; they preferred to remain secluded in their sphere.
For a survey of the physicists' views on policy, see Donald A Strickland, Physicists'
View of Space Politics, 29 PUB. OPINION Q. 223, 227, 231-32 (1965).
19. Arnold L. Horelick, Outer Space and Earth Bound Politics, 13 WORLD
POL. 323, 323 (1961).
20. The mood among American lawyers in the "Sputnik crisis" is well captured
in Barton Beebe, Law's Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing the Future in the
Early Corpus Juris Spatialis, 108 YALE L.J. 1737 (1999).
21. O.J. Lissitzyn, The American Position in Outer Space and Antarctica, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 126-27 (1959).
7
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code.22 However, academia disapproved of these statements, for they
were not consonant with the prevailing political situation.23  In any
case, both approaches had the aim of safeguarding realist interests in
space.24 On the other side, Soviet lawyers advocated a policy of
peaceful coexistence, which was criticized by the United States as
being part of an "ideological battle" to spread "proletarian
internationalism." 25  The concept of peaceful coexistence found its
way from policy desks all the way to classrooms as indoctrination
through two companion volumes on Soviet space law published in
1962-The Cosmos and International Law and The Way to Space
Law.26 Although couched in the vocabulary of internationalism, the
nationalist interests of the Soviets in the peaceful coexistence doctrine
cannot be ignored, for it sought to put humankind in pursuit of a
communist world order.27  In addition to their respective national
22. Id. at 128.
23. Both views are captured in Lissitzyn, supra note 21, at 130.
24. For example, one among the claims made by the legal adviser of the
Department of State, Loftus E. Becker, was complete and exclusive sovereignty over
air space, which extends to 10,000 miles from the surface of the Earth. Drawing on
the Antarctica analogy, he asserted that U.S. rights over outer space need no specific
claim on the country's part, as its activities in outer space have created a right upon
which it would be justified in asserting territorial claims. Opposing this view,
Professor Lissitzyn argued that this claim is absurd since the United States has not
recognized 10,000 miles as the upper limit of sovereignty, a condition for
determining exclusive and complete sovereignty over the area. However, his real
concern was the following: "If the Soviet Union should also make a claim of
sovereignty on the basis of similar activities, where should the boundary between
the two sovereignties be drawn?" For details, see Lissitzyn, supra note 21, at 129.
25. A critical view of the Soviet approach to space law appears in Robert D.
Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685
(1962). For an issue-based approach, see Samuel Kucherov, Legal Problems of
Outer Space: USA and Soviet Viewpoints, 2 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 64
(1959).
26. Robert D. Crane, The Beginnings of Marxist Space Jurisprudence?, 57 AM.
J. INT'L L. 615, 618, 619 (1963).
27. With the concept of peaceful coexistence, the U.S.S.R. intended a
communist form of "superstructure" and thereby a new reality that avoided any kind
of opposition to its political and economic strategies and put humankind under a
communist world order. This strategy was criticized for a distortion of the doctrine
of historical materialism. See Crane, Soviet Attitude, supra note 25, at 715, 716.
Nationalist intentions are also evident in many issue areas, for example, delimitation
of outer space, where certain ideological inadequacies were pointed out by the
8
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interests, the superpowers differed in their opinion on many issue
areas, which certainly hampers the development of a body of law.
Certain scholars felt that an emphasis on internationalization could
eliminate the tribulations of superpower rivalry (strategic as well as
ideological) and build a "comprehensive and complex outer space
system" benefiting all peoples. 28  Their focus was a kind of
institutionalism, preferably under the United Nations, 29 since
"coordination" then was synonymous with institutions, which in turn
was synonymous with the United Nations. Although the United
Nations did undertake coordination activities by way of some ad hoc
arrangements, its complex formalism and lack of proper institutions
and procedures failed to secure the expected coordination. 30 There
was also a lack of a real sense of duties to be performed. Hence,
epistemic forums were looked to as the ideal platform at that time.
Coincidentally, Andrew G. Haley, a Washington lawyer, was elected
president of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF), which
during his tenure established the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL-). 3  From the very start, the IISL focused its activities on
studying various legal issues rather than securing intergovernmental
cooperation; from its very inception, it tended to be an agora. A few
initial colloquia of the IISL witnessed efforts to pump law into the
vacuum. Yet, on the whole, there was rather little talk of
internationalism; the social dimension of space activities was also
absent, and there was even a quixotic touch to many contributions. A
hard-science syndrome was evident throughout the forum, in which
legal problems wrapped in scientific niceties were seen as a matter of
prestige for the authors. Scientists were deities. However, the fact
Soviet Union.
28. Klaus Knorr, On the International Implications of Outer Space, 12 WORLD
POL. 564, 567 (1960).
29. Id. Nongovernmental academic and professional bodies like the IAF were
also considered. See, e.g., Michel S. Smirnoff, The Role of JAF in the Elaboration
of the Norms of Future Space Law, 2 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 147 (1959).
30. But see James Simsarian, Outer Space Co-operation in the United Nations,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1963).
31. For details, see ANDREW G. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 364-70
(1963). Glimpses of the preparatory work that led to the IISL are articulated in
Eugene Pepin, Proposals for the Future Work of the Permanent Legal Committee of
the International Astronautical Federation, 2 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 123,
124 (1959).
9
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that historically the Institute was a sister undertaking of the IAF-a
technical body-in all likelihood spawned a nascent legal-scientific
community within the IISL. The concern that science was
outstripping law, aggravated by the boastings of the scientific
scholarship,32 was felt seriously by the legal community, which
expressed its regret that, for example, "[i]f satellites always burned up
as they reentered the atmosphere and before they reached the earth, we
would not have the legal problem of responsibility for damage.
33
Since satellites did not always burn up during reentry, they made a
call to pool legal and scientific resources.34 However, the IISL could
never equilibrate effectively between the two streams and that was to
become the Institute's biggest handicap (this is dealt with in due
course below).
The general impression during the era was that it was the lack of
political will that thwarted international cooperation in space
activities. Certain quarters sensed an emerging "technological
determinism" and thought that it might secure cooperation; however,
it in no way could have substituted for political will. 35 - The
policymakers aimed at establishing a global satellite consortium. To
this end, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) was established as an attempt at functional integration,36
for it was the conviction at that time that functional organizations
could surmount the forces of politics. 37 INTELSAT's organizational
structure was built up and strategies were programmed for an interface
between technological dynamism and political choices, 38 which
32. The danger lurking in such an attitude is articulated in David Madsen, The
Scholar, the Scientist, and Society: Unifying the Intellectual Community, 38 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 96 (1967).
33. Eilene Galloway, The Community of Law and Science, 1 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
OUTER SPACE 59, 60 (1958).
34. See id at 61.
35. Walter A. McDougall, Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space Age-
Toward the History of a Saltation, 87 AM. HIST. R. 1010, 1021 (1982).
36. Id. Jonathan F. Galloway, Worldwide Corporations and International
Integration: The Case of INTELSAT, 24 INT'L ORG. 503, 515-17 (1970). For the
functional integration theory, see DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM
(1966).
37. McDougall, supra note 35.
38. For details, see Steven A. Levy, INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the
Transformation of a Regime, 29 INT'L ORG. 655, 658 (1975). For more on the
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss2/4
2008] WHITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW, THITHER SPACE LAW 341
secured some degree of cohesion in global communications. Yet, the
organization did not bring expected internationalization at the political
level. 39 What the venture did do was inculcate a corporate culture into
the space sector and create a new set of space professionals-the
managers.
Amid these developments, the United Nations, which hitherto had
exhibited some kind of procedural inactivity, started to respond
positively to the failing cooperation in space activities. In August
1962, Manfred Lachs, then a Polish diplomat, assumed the office of
Chair of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). He was not one of
those diplomats torn between excessive enthusiasm and complex
pragmatism. He was a pragmatist who, to quote Thomas Franck,
"panned for nuggets of utility in the raging torrents of ideology., 40 He
initiated the work of the committee with an artistic elegance; with an
appeal to the legal community to shed its abject feeling of inferiority,
he evoked the humanness of scientists and underlined the need for a
professional fraternity among the two:
[S]cientists were no longer confined to the ivory towers of their
laboratories, and the effects of their work on human and
international relations were becoming felt with increasing rapidity.
International law should likewise not be regarded as an intellectual
poor relation of science, but should be used decisively to deal with
the practical effects of the discovery of a new dimension.
4 1
Lachs' vision was sublime, based as it was on the understanding that
the world is confronted with two conflicting ends-science and
society:
technical and economic aspects of INTELSAT, see Marcellus S. Snow, INTELSAT:
An International Example, 30 J. COMM. 147 (1980).
39. Scholars such as Levy and Jonathan F. Galloway claim that INTELSAT
has achieved this goal as well. However, their arguments are not convincing in this
regard, although they have demonstrated an element of cohesion in global
communications.
40. Thomas M. Franck, The Private Lachs: Life as Art, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,
419 (1993).
41. U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 1st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.1 (Aug.
21, 1962).
11
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On the one hand, there was the fear lest men should become a
prisoner of his own scientific and technical inventions; on the other
hand, there was confidence in the progressive development of
man's mastery over nature and his use of it to serve his noblest
aspirations.
4 2
Science cannot single-handedly guide humankind to achieve its
goals, for it cannot effect the transition from facts to norms.
Therefore, science must be subjected to philosophical scrutiny, which
can comprehend societal values and effect the transition from facts to
norms smoothly.43 Lawyers engaged in philosophical criticism in
hermitic isolation will be too thinly supplied with facts and likely to
misapprehend the values. Hence, both scientists and lawyers should
carry on an effective dialogue in order to synthesize facts and norms.
Such a synthesis can dismantle the destructive powers of the world
and draw benefit from science and technology for constructive human
purposes. This vision was realized by creating a legal and a technical
subcommittee that was to arrange for a dialogue between scientists
and lawyers-"an imaginative and innovative effort at international
legislation within the United Nations, 44 which Lachs referred to as a
"phenomenon., 45
Simultaneously with this measure, UNCOPUOS adopted a new
dialectic method of consensual decision making-a procedure
previously unknown in the United Nations.46  It is a multilevel
negotiating structure whereby the big powers negotiate first in their
capital cities. Once their common interest takes space, a "corridor
negotiation" easily brings others under the umbrella-a process
42. Id. at 3-4.
43. JAMES S. FULTON, SCIENCE AND MAN'S HOPE (1954) (emphasizing the
value-barrenness of science in the absence of a philosophical outlook).
44. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, A Survey of Space Law as Developed by the
United Nations, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995).
45. Manfred Lachs, Foreword, in MANUAL OF SPACE LAW VOL. 1, xii
(Nandasiri Jasentuliyana & Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1979).
46. Although UNCOPUOS set out the consensus procedure in 1959, it was not
put into practice until 1962. For details, see Eilene Galloway, Consensus as a Basis
for International Space Cooperation, 20 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 105
(1978) (discussing how the use of the consensus method proved successful in
shaping legal agreements on international space cooperation).
12
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generally dubbed "higher-level consensus. 47 By the time the issue
under consideration reaches the negotiation room, consensus has been
secured.48 In UNCOPUOS, it might have been the hope that a
consensus between the superpowers could bring about unanimity
among other countries.49
Yet, none of the new legislative formulas proved to be the magic
potion to fetch cooperation in one gulp. In the committee's work,
what the technical subcommittee essentially recommended for
carrying out space activities was congenial working conditions,
authorization, resources and, above all, international cooperation.5 °
However, in the legal subcommittee, ideology and political concerns
cumbered efforts at cooperation, which to a large extent maintained
the inertia in lawmaking. Not even first-level consensus could be
secured, as neither of the superpowers relaxed its position. The
subcommittee felt that, given the unyielding stance of the
superpowers, consensus could materialize only if the subcommittee
relaxed its requirements. Since internationalization of all outer space
activities appeared idealistic as a yardstick, the subcommittee reduced
the standards of cooperation and reset the goal as being to secure the
maximum possible cooperation.51
47. Amitai Etzoni, The Dialectics of Supranational Unification, 56 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 927 (1962).
48. Considering the informal nature of these negotiations, preliminary
negotiations between states were neither reported nor archived. See BIN CHENG,
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 165 (1997).
49. See id. at 148 (the superpower ascendancy to which Cheng refers relates to
the UN General Assembly).
50. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Outer Space and International Cooperation, 19
INT'L ORG. 603, 612 (1965) (some of the recommendations for which the
Committee gave authorization included:
1) further steps to facilitate exchange of information; 2) support for
international programs such as the International Year of the Quiet Sun and
the World Magnetic Survey; 3) increased national participation . . .; 4)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) fellowships to assist scientific and technical training; and 5)
the establishment of sounding rocket facilities under UN
sponsorship ....
Id. at 612.
51. See id. at 608-09.
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B. Generality: The Hallmark
The new approach crept into the subcommittee's strategy in such
a manner that whatever regulations were to be prescribed thenceforth
should be of a general nature. The approach gave ample room for
nations to maneuver whenever their national pride and prestige was at
risk in the consensus procedure, for generality only creates
commitments of a general nature: specific obligations are difficult to
identify. The "space" consequently created by generality was
sufficiently broad that opposing state positions-realism and
communism-came to cohabit it under the same headings.52
Principles creating general obligations now started to take shape. The
initial optimism was that these general obligations could be narrowed
down to more specific ones-according the principles the status of
"criteri[a] of the legality ' 53 or "ground rules for the future exploration
and use of outer space . . . ."" In addition, the principles, although
broad, were seen as generating certain shared expectations among the
states and giving them certain clues to setting optimal policy goals.55
The subsequent Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) 56 melded the
principles together did not deviate from the general nature of those
principles, for UNCOPUOS apprehended that any variation from what
52. The first resolution spelling out a set of principles governing the activities
of states in outer space, Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, was secured under the new
strategy of consensual decision making. The two superpowers, which had stood
antagonistic to one other until then united under the broad legal framework provided
by the resolution. See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR,
18th Sess., 128th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962 (1963).
53. GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 40
(1984).
54. CHENG, supra note 48, at 153.
55. But see Harry H. Almond, General Principles of Law-Their Role in the
Development of the Law of Outer Space, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 871 (1986).
56. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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had been secured thus far might break the thin thread binding the
states together in cooperation.
The Outer Space Treaty was warmly received by the international
community of states. It laid down principles such as freedom of
exploration, international responsibility of states for national activities
in outer space, the duty to assist astronauts in peril, exclusive peaceful
use of celestial bodies, and not stationing nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction in outer space.57 Yet, little did the states
that took part in the negotiations know that the Outer Space Treaty
was an opportune diplomatic code negotiated to ensure cooperation
between the superpowers. Most of the principles of which states felt
proud and which scholars glorified 58 have virtually no normative
content or import. For example, in order to make sense of "peaceful
use" of outer space, scholars desperately run between "non-
aggressive" and "non-military." 59  Freedom of exploration means
hardly anything for the majority of states, for whom space is a remote
reality, partial demilitarization of outer space is puzzling, 60 and the
meaning of "international responsibility" for states is far from the real
normative sense of the term.61 Nevertheless, in the superpowers'
57. See generally id.
58. The Outer Space Treaty has been glorified by scholars as, for example, "the
foundation of the international legal order in outer space" (Jasentuliyana, supra note
44, at 359), "a concrete base" (I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Some Observations
Regarding the Treaty on Space Law, 10 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 164, 164
(1967)), "the charter" (Eilene Galloway, Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5 ANNALS AIR AND SPACE L. 481,
481 (1980)), and "the Magna Carta for space activities" (Eilene Galloway,
Expanding Space Law into the 21st Century, 35 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 49,
52(1992)).
59. See, e.g., J.E.S. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER
SPACE 29-34 (1968); Linda Johanna Friman, War and Peace in Outer Space: A
Review of the Legality of the Weaponization of Outer Space in the Light of the
Prohibition on Non-Peaceful Purposes, 16 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 285, 285 (2005)
(the oscillation between non-aggressive and non-military has been presented within
the framework of apologist and utopian positions in the international legal
arguments as articulated by Martti Koskenniemi).
60. For instance, Damodar Wadegaonkar feels that the demilitarization clause
of the Outer Space Treaty is imperfectly drafted and somewhat illogical. DAMODAR
WADEGAONKAR, THE ORBIT OF SPACE LAW 13 (1984).
61. See S.G. Sreejith, International Space Law: A Saga of Mankind's Lost
Aspirations-Introductory Episode, 2 AALCO Q. BULL. 1, 6-8 (2006).
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perspective, the hollowness of the same principles becomes
phenomenally transformed into evocative standards of mutual
conduct. For instance, freedom means "survival of the fittest";
ambiguity in the meaning of peaceful use makes it subjectively and
expediently determined. Partial demilitarization is favorable for both
superpowers, as they themselves are the armers and disarmers, i.e., to
paraphrase Fawcett, the right hand has to devise military capabilities
and the left defend against them.62 Finally, control by international
law and the Charter of the United Nations validates the inherent right
of self-defense by the superpowers, which presupposes the possibility
of an armed attack in outer space as well.
63
In essence, the Outer Space Treaty is a risk-free contractual
instrument of bilateral scope meant for the superpowers. A trick of
international diplomacy, however, furnished it with the image of an
inchoate instrument requiring development, which was vigorously
pursued by the scholars in the field. They indoctrinated the novices
on the elementariness and generality of the Treaty; no one had even an
iota of suspicion regarding the Treaty's two-fold image. Virtually
every scholarly work on the Treaty ends with an emphasis on its
generality, 64 an optimism for progress, 65 and a call for revision.
66
62. FAWCETT, supra note 59, at 29.
63. But see CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Ti-E MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 35-37 (1982).
64. Jasentuliyana, supra note 44, at 359-61 (maintaining that the Outer Space
Treaty has "broad parameters" which can serve as the foundation on which more
detailed rules can be built).
65. Joanne I. Gabrynowicz voices such an optimism regarding space law in
general. "[I]nternational space law has completed its first phase. Important general
principles-some of them, historic-were articulated and agreed upon by a majority
of nations. The next generation of space law involves agreeing on specific
norms ... [Many] questions, . . . are yet to be answered." Joanne I. Gabrynowicz,
Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1041, 1047 (2004). See also Ivan A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty:
A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REv. 507, 519 (1967) (expressing doubt that
by the Space Treaty, the "quasi-legislative role of the [UN] General Assembly...
may have been undermined, and the authority of its future law-oriented space
resolutions diminished .... It would be most unfortunate for the cause of public
order in outer space if the future shows that states have by their recent action on the
Space Treaty permanently impaired the decision-making usefulness of the United
Nations General Assembly.").
66. See, e.g., Ty S. Twibell, Circumnavigating International Space Law, 4
16
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Only a small minority make an appeal against any tampering with the
Treaty.
With the Outer Space Treaty, UNCOPUOS nevertheless
accomplished the first step towards its mission of securing
international cooperation in outer space. The Committee paid no heed
to the repercussions in the form of generality that its course of action
had wrought throughout the discipline. The space law that developed
afterward in UNCOPUOS also focused on international cooperation,
67
regardless of the normative compromises it might have to make in
securing cooperation. Further efforts to craft specific obligations, in
the "cooperation compromise," created more general and
inconsequential obligations even for specific activities. For example,
the Rescue Agreement 68 imposes an unconditional obligation to return
astronauts and space objects to the launching state but lacks any
specific provision for the settlement of claims. 69  The Liability
Convention 70 lays down absolute and fault liability for the damage
caused by space objects yet leaves the compensation concerns to be
determined by the myriad principles of equity and justice.7 The
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1997). Twibell explores various ways to "vaccinate"
the Outer Space Treaty, which in his view is infected with a virus. Id. at 274-95.
His focus indicates that the virus is the "no-sovereignty" laid down by the Treaty.
Id. at 271-72. See also Kendra Webb, To Infinity and Beyond: The Adequacy of
Current Space Law to Cover Torts Committed in Outer Space, 16 TULANE J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 295, 313 (2007) (the call for revision, however, applies to the entire
space law).
67. For a review of the development of space law in the United Nations, see
generally Vladimir Kopal, United Nations and the Progressive Development of
International Space Law, 7 FINNISH Y. B. INT'L L. 1 (1996) (discussing how space
law became an essential part of international law during the last half of the twentieth
century).
68. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968,
672 U.N.T.S. 119.
69. CHENG, supra note 48, at 282-83.
70. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
71. See generally BRUCE A. HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES (1992) (discussing the danger posed by abandoned space objects and the
lack of liability assumed by the launching countries for that danger such objects
pose if and when they fall to earth).
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Registration Convention 72 is no more than a log-book system.7 3 And,
the Moon Agreement74 witnessed the heights of legal speculation, as a
result of which states fought a war of shadows and came out with
nothing. 7
Nevertheless, the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny were in
effect realistic, at least giving them a role in securing superpower
cooperation. The tool of generality which was used for securing
cooperation, although it did not create any specific binding
obligations, brought all space activities-and the associated virulent
forms of nationalism and clash of ideologies-under the umbrella of
international law.76 In the meantime, international law had become a
forum for a remarkable scholarly discourse, by Myers McDougal,
which was to have a crucial bearing on space law as well, although it
passed unobserved by the space law community. That discourse is
presented and its impact examined by way of a putative debate with
Wilfred Jenks in the next section.
C. Jenks Versus McDougal: A Telling Debate Overlooked
Jenks and McDougal had their own respective visions of the
future world order. Interestingly, human conquest of outer space
occurred when both the scholars were in the process of devising
schemes for the deployment of their respective ideas, and they found
outer space to be an ideologically and normatively amorphous domain
where they could try out their schemes. What else could prompt a UN
official and a champion of a new stream of legal thought to muse over
human interests in an inorganic domain? Whatever their motives,
72. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
73. For details of the Convention, including its drafting history, see Nicolas M.
Matte, The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1
ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 231 (1976).
74. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
75. The major dispute between the states in the negotiations regarded the
exploitation and sharing of the natural resources of the Moon. See generally Carl Q.
Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985).
76. But see Manfred Lachs, The International Law of Outer Space, in RECUEIL
DES COURSE III 41, 41-46 (1964).
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they did frame schemes for outer space with grave concern,
interestingly, differing significantly.
1. Jenks and the Common Law of Mankind
Disappointed by the negative balance of power which
characterized the world at the time, Jenks sought a "common law of
mankind" which could reinstate the balance and to which all nations
of the world could subscribe.77 In a subsequent work, he expressed
the conviction that the law ;f nations could be shaped into such a
common law, 78 although an imbalance existed in the form of the law
of nations. As an initial step, Jenks appeals to lawyers to build a
"universality of perspectives," embracing all the legal systems of the
world, and to discover the "will of the world community,, 79 which
would furnish the basis for a new set of norms. The fact that such
norms emerge from the will of the community would be the basis of
obligation in international law. Basically, to quote Richard S. Miller,
"Jenks's approach is that of the experienced international lawyer
working within the framework of legal positivism to increase respect
for rules of international law and thereby to encourage states which
are members of the international community to submit their conduct to
the application of those rules." 8
0
Jenks extended his general scheme of law to the law of outer
space. In his address to the IISL in 1968, upon reviewing the
development of space law, he pointed out a narrowness in the
substantive approach of the discipline. "Space law, like air law, is not
a substantive branch of the law .... It consists of an angle of
preoccupation with a wide range of diverse problems rather than a
well-defined area demarcated by the substance of the problems which
it embraces." 81
77. The seminal work in this connection is C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON
LAW OF MANKIND (1958).
78. See generally C. WILFRED JENKS, LAW, FREEDOM, AND WELFARE (1964).
79. Richard S. Miller, Legal Scholarship, Realism, and the Search for
Minimum World Order, 17 WORLD POL. 478, 478-80 (1965).
80. Id. at 479.
81. C. Wilfred Jenks, Seven Stages in the Development of Space Law, 11 PRoc.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 246, 262-63 (1968).
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Jenks felt that such an approach was a requisite of the
developmental stage of space law however, for the then ongoing
phase, he emphasized the need to view the problems of space law
through a wider spectrum. In other words, to paraphrase Jenks, space
law had to be integrated into the development of the common law of
mankind and to be situated wholly within the context of the
relationship between humankind and its environment created by
contemporary scientific and technological advancements. 82  He
believed that the Outer Space Treaty and other UN Declarations on
space would develop into the "common law of mankind" in the form
of a World Science Treaty, which would provide "the framework for a
concerted long-term effort to preserve and enlarge human freedom
and human dignity in a world in which unprecedented resources of
knowledge and skill create an unprecedented challenge and an
unprecedented opportunity." 83 However, Jenks' positivist scheme met
resistance from McDougal's policy-oriented jurisprudence, which was
embedded in the social context and viewed law as the outcome of an
authoritative decision-making process.
2. McDougal and Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence
As a teacher, Myres McDougal advocated a policy-oriented legal
curriculum that enabled his students to break out from the sterile
world of abstract and contextless legal doctrines and sought to engage
them in building a new world order.84 As a scholar, he dreamt of an
individual-centered world order.85 Such was McDougal's flair that
whatever he posited as a scholar he sought to import to his charges as
a teacher.
82. Id. at 263.
83. Id.
84. Luther L. McDougal III, Professor Myres S. McDougal's Contribution to
Legal Education, 66 MISS. L.J. 27, 30 (1996). See also the tribute by Dame Rosalyn
Higgins in Rosalyn Higgins, McDougal as Teacher, Mentor, and Friend, 108 YALE
L.J. 957 (1999).
85. W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free
Society, 108 YALE L.J. 935, 937 (1999). Reisman emphasizes that, although
centered on human beings, McDougal's theory is not one of excessive
libertarianism. Rather, its aim is to enhance the wider participation of individuals in
societal decision-making. Id.
20
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McDougal's theory (in addition to its conventional designation
"policy-oriented jurisprudence," the theory is known as "value-
oriented jurisprudence," which is more appropriate) aims at a world
order based on human dignity where the individual is the nucleus.86
However, in modem societies, aspirations for justice, peace, and
security for individuals, who are under a sovereign nation state subject
to the norms of international law, cannot be realized.87 Moreover, the
general failure of international law to attain universal effectiveness,
which has enabled totalitarian regimes to grow, exacerbates the
situation. 88 Human dignity becomes an illusion. "McDougal [and his
associate Harold] Lasswell attempt to bypass the internal and external
sovereignty [the real culprit] of nation-states by defining a 'world
social process' in which individuals participate directly.",89 In other
words, they deny any participation by a national society on behalf of
its members. Such denial is incident to the attempt to build a world
public order, whereby individuals and groups strive to maximize
values within the limits of their capability, "individually in their own
behalf and in concert with others with whom they share symbols of
common identity and ways of life of varying degrees of
elaboration." 90 In this scheme, in order to prevent the burgeoning of
any totalitarian regimes, any attempts at a universal culture of shared
beliefs, meanings, values, purposes, and principles are cast off.91
Human dignity-the core of the order-is said to have been
achieved when values are widely shared (maximization of values) and
private choice is underlined as the "predominant modality of
power." 92 This phenomenon entails a social process. But how is the
86. Gray L. Dorsey, The McDougal-Lasswell Proposal to Build a World Public
Order, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 42 (1988).
87. Id.
88. Id. Universalism, say McDougal and Lasswell, "has had the effect of
undercutting the authority of every doctrine put forward in the name of the whole
body of nations." Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-5 (1959).
As examples of totalitarian regimes, they cite Nazi and Communist regimes. Id.
89. Dorsey, supra note 86, at 42.
90. Id. (quoting Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1959)).
91. See id. at 43.
92. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 88, at 11.
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social process achieved? In other words, how are values maximized?
At this point, McDougal and Lasswell call upon the scholars of
international law to "disclose to as many as possible of the effective
leaders, and constituencies of leaders, throughout the globe the
compatibility between their aspirations and the policies that expedite
peaceful co-operation on behalf of a public order of human dignity."
93
It is also up to scholars to give shape to the specific forms of
institutions and processes for facilitating the maximization of values,
law being one such process. 94 Rather than engage in abstract and
dogmatic debates, scholars should "shift [their focus] to the appraisal
of contemporary structures according to their positive or negative
impact upon present and prospective value-shaping and sharing."
95
Only then can the world order based on human dignity become a
reality.
Given this scholarly scheme, what might have prompted
McDougal to write Law and Public Order in Space-an 1100 page
treatise on space law? Did the understanding conform to his world
order? Or, was it a random scholarly act producing a bulky reader?
According to a former student, the law of outer space seemed like an
"eccentric interest of Mac's., 96 On the scholarly side, his treatise is
branded as no more than a mere "handbook of analogies," one
"marred by excessive conceptualism, failure to differentiate legal from
other problems, and preoccupation with the extraneous." 97 However,
McDougal had the conviction that outer space was yet another realm
where value sharing takes place, and most effectively. 98 However, in
93. Id. at 29.
94. According to McDougal and Lasswell, "legal process" is the making of
authoritative decisions and law is the "conjunction of common expectations
concerning authority with a high degree of corroboration." See McDougal &
Lasswell, supra note 88, at 9.
95. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 88, at 29. For an application of this
method, see generally Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented
Jurisprudence, 4 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 96 (2001) (discussing policy-oriented
jurisprudence as a concept developed to provide legal professionals and others with
a framework to understand and shape the law).
96. Jos6 A. Cabranes, quoted in YALE BULLETIN AND CALENDAR, May 1998.
97. Richard Posner, Law and Public Order in Space, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1370,
1373 (1964) (reviewing MYREs S. McDouGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
SPACE (1963)).
98. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
22
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that sector, the community process-including value sharing-is
imperceptible; various intellectual techniques are required to reveal it
and thus to shape apposite policy goals. 99 In this scheme, McDougal
postulates the same goal as he had for the earth arena-realization of a
society based on human dignity. 100
In order to build an effective public order in space-a "space
commonwealth," as McDougal and his colleagues called it-scholars
should aim for optimum designs for the space age,' 0' even if world
politics (of the 1960s) constrains those efforts. As the first step, they
should form a pattern of value distribution by inviting interested
people from diverse regions to join in discovering and proposing
policy principles and specific policies concerning space.' 12  The
second step would be to clarify value shaping and value sharing by
establishing a legal order and relevant institutions. At this stage, it
should be ensured that the "facilities of the legal order ... do in fact
harmonize with the requirement[s] of human dignity."' 0 3 An effective
legal order exists only when its institutions have authority and control.
McDougal, however, dissociates authority and control from power, in
whose stead he sees individual-centrism: i.e. authority exists when it is
"embedded in the expectations of the effective participants in the
world community." 104 Nevertheless, it cannot "be taken for granted
that human expectations" are stagnant; expectations always change as
society changes. 10 5  A treaty or charter, if considered as the
representation of authority, will, given its inertness, trail behind the
dynamism of society. 0 6  In contrast authority embedded in the
participants' expectations provides the desired balance between the
SPACE (1963).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1025.
101. See id at 1027. While making their prescription, McDougal and his
associates insert the caveat that their recommendations are highly tentative,
generalized, and approximate in terms of several aspects of the overall problem.
102. See id. at 142.
103. Id. at 145.
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community process and social context by enabling a less complex
transformation along with individual expectations.1
0 7
3. The Debate
1) Jenks calls upon scholars to identify the common will of
individuals and thereby facilitate the formation of a robust
international legal framework. Space lawyers should endeavor to
discover shared perspectives parallel to the identified common will for
space and then integrate those into the broad international legal
framework and make a larger whole. In effect, he takes a holistic
approach towards space law, asserting that space law is not a self-
sufficient discipline distinct from international law. However, Jenks'
robust legal framework, what he calls the "common law of mankind,"
exists in the form of comprehensive treaties and principles, both
general and particular.' 0 8 This approach is contentious for McDougal
(although he does not oppose there being scope for formal agreements
and rules), who asserts that only particular subjects in space law need
to be addressed by formal agreements. "The remainder of what a
future historian will ... be entitled to call 'The Law of Outer Space[]'
...is conceived as the community's expectation about the ways in
which authority will and should be prescribed and applied .... ,,l09
2) Jenks wants to seek common will through universality; his
conception of universality emphasizes the need to develop rules of
universal applicability through a comparative study and synthesis of
various legal systems."l 0 McDougal, on the other hand, calls for an
intellectual movement which can perform value maximization, i.e.,
one much akin to Jenks' comparative study."' However, in an earlier
work with Lasswell, McDougal cautioned against the dangers of
107. See id. at 1036.
108. Jenks' faith in the formal sources of law is highlighted in C. WILFRED
JENKS, SPACE LAW (1966).
109. McDougal & Lipson, supra note 12, at 420.
110. Miller, supra note 79, at 481 (attempting to repudiate Jenks' "model of
universality" using McDougal and Feliciano on the grounds of "normative
ambiguity"). But see C. Wilfred Jenks, The Need for an International Legislative
Drafting Bureau, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1945); C. Wilfred Jenks, Craftsmanship in
International Law, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 32 (1956).
111. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 88, at 28.
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universality.112 His opposition primarily regarded putting the whole
world in pursuit of a single doctrine or ideology. His fear might have
been a communist base for all space activities. Jenks' idea of
comparative study and then maximizing universality is not
objectionable vis-A-vis McDougal's scheme. But, what is
objectionable for McDougal is Jenks' faith in legal doctrines and
principles as a factor in decision making for the institutions that are to
maximize shared values. This objection stems from McDougal's
realization that those who will be making authoritative decisions for
space will be the officials of the nation states making claims. "13 When
such officials believe that particular claims bear heavily on the
prominent values of their own state, they will manipulate legal
doctrines and principles for the realization of preferred values;" 14 that
is, in the name of freedom of use and exploration, outer space possibly
will be subject to power politics.
3) For Jenks, the will of the world community is the force urging
compliance with rules and submission to international adjudication.
However, McDougal eschews this traditional positivist approach of
law as rules and rules as binding. First, he reduces rules to
"receptacles of useful information,"" 5 and secondly recasts law from
its rules mold to a "delicate balance of authority and control" whereby
authority "'is a set of conditioned subjectivities shared by relevant
members of a group"' and control 'refers to resources that can be
employed to secure a desired pattern of behavior in others."' 116 What
secures compliance is the degree of authority (uniformity) and height
of control (expectations)." 7
112. Id. at 4-5.
113. McDougal & Lipson, supra note 12, at 418. For the discussion leading to
this finding, see id. at 413-17.
114. The doctrines of international law vulnerable to such manipulation,
according to McDougal, include sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, non-
intervention, independence, and equality. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 88,
at 4.
115. Tom J. Farer, International Law and Political Behavior: Toward a
Conceptual Liaison, 25 WORLD POL. 430, 434 (1973).
116. Id. at 435. Farer quotes the definitions from W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (1971).
117. Id. (drawing on McDougal & Lasswell).
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Did space law scholars respond to McDougal's critique of Jenks'
theory? What impact have McDougal's and Jenks' works had among
space lawyers? What should space lawyers have learned from the
debate?
McDougal's policy-oriented jurisprudence appeared at a time
when the legislative exercise for space was torn between two
conflicting academic traditions in law-the American and the
Victorian traditions of law. Whereas Victorian positivists like Jenks
stood for a legal order based on doctrines, rules, and equity and
comprising treaties, international custom, and general principles of
law, American scholars held an instrumentalist view that law is an
apparatus to balance societal interests and that any further action
should be directed in terms of this conception of law. It was this
conflict that was thwarting any attempt to govern human activities in
space, whereas the general impression was that ideological differences
between the superpowers were the sole cause of the deadlock.
However, space law scholars vigorously pursued the positivist
strategy by regulating state conduct through treaties and rules; most of
the time they ignored the societal dimension of space activities.
Filling the legal vacuum by way of a comprehensive or particular
treaty1l 8 and taming the superpowers were the only goals before
scholars in the discipline, and these goals resulted in disposable
diplomatic instruments. McDougal, in contrast, linked law with the
"unfolding pattern of effective and authoritative decisions concerning
the distribution of values in [a] social system[]" and thereby provided
a social spectrum for evaluating legal relationships. "9 This approach
would have created a normatively stronger public order for space,
maintaining the common interest of all peoples. The absence of such
an approach posed challenges when the societal impact of space
118. See, e.g., Cyril E.S. Horsford, The Need for a Moon Treaty and
Clarification of the Legal Status of Space Vehicles, 9 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 48 (1966) and Giovanni Meloni, International Liability for Space Activity, 10
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 185 (1967). Meloni, after analyzing numerous and
complex aspects of international liability for space activities, discusses the character
of a future convention on liability. Id. at 194.
119. Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions
of Myres S. McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 63 (1972). Young nevertheless
adopted a critical stance on McDougal's scheme. For a response by McDougal, see
Myres S. McDougal, International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in
Avoidance, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1972).
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exploration, in its later stages, became apparent and the need to
safeguard rights to the benefits from space. In reacting to the
challenge, scholars inundated the forums, initially with commentaries
and interpretations, 120 and later on painstakingly stretched the scope of
the treaties to virtually every space application,' 21 albeit with no
concrete outcome. This was particularly evident in the case of the
Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle, where, as the
conceptions of "community property, . . community benefit .... and
benefit[s] of the posterity" clashed with the principle of sovereignty,
the principle "floundered at the altar of state sovereignty
[doctrine].', 122  The never-ending doctrinal debate on the CHM 123
might have been averted had the international community's
expectations of the relevant players been effectively assessed in terms
of the policies to be used to secure the expected behavior of them.
However, space law scholarship failed to perceive the significance
of McDougal's interference in what was then the generally accepted
pattern of thought in international law, Jenks being its mouthpiece.
Neither McDougal and his colleagues nor anyone in the New Haven
School expressed further concern for space law. Space law, however,
gradually moved towards unusual levels of thinking, mostly under the
auspices of epistemic forums such as the IISL.
120. See, e.g., Bozidar Bakotic, Some Pragmatic Reflections on Article IV of
the 1967 Space Treaty, 25 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 73 (1982); P.P.C.
Haanappel, Article XI of the Moon Treaty, 23 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 29
(1980).
121. See, e.g., H. A. Wassenbergh, Speculation on the Law Governing Space
Resources, 5 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 611 (1980) and Frans G. von der Dunk,
Public Space Law and Private Enterprise-The Fitness of International Space Law
Instruments for Private Space Activities, 1999 PROC. PROJECT 2001--WORKSHOP
ON LEGAL ISSUES OF PRIVATISING SPACE ACTIVITIES 12 (2001).
122. V.S. Mani, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Implications for the Legal
Status of Property Rights on the Moon and Celestial Bodies, 39 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
OUTER SPACE 31, 31, 33 (1996).
123. See Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the
Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations
Reach a Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 409 (2003).
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D. Space Law in the IISL
By the time the Permanent Committee on Space Law of the IAF
became the IISL in 1960, the pioneers had sketched a syllabus for
future scholars, e.g., dividing zones of space and determining
extraterrestrial jurisdiction,1 24 crafting of an agreement, 25 advocating
the peaceful uses of outer space,' 26 and providing doctrinal
clarifications. 127 However, those who followed them, irrespective of
the topic they discussed, sought to situate all the items in the syllabus
in a comprehensive or particular treaty 128 and in an agency for
enforcement with universalistic ideals. 129 The accelerating pace of
technological growth and the emergence of new applications were to
stir scholarly ingenuity. Scholars plunged into the technological
dynamism in order to address the challenge; establishing an
equilibrium between science and law appeared to be the tool of
choice.
124. See, e.g., John C. Cooper, The Problem of Definition of 'Air Space' 1
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 38 (1958); Henri T.P. Binet, Toward Solving the
Space Sovereignty Problem, 2 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 11 (1959); Andrew
G. Haley, Survey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction, 3 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 37 (1960).
125. Jean Rivoire, Design for a Law of Space, 1 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 97 (1958); Escobar Faria, Draft to an International Covenant for Outer
Space-The Treaty of Antarctica as a Prototype, 3 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE
122 (1960).
126. Such advocacy had the intention of safeguarding the rights of peoples of
all nations to the beneficial results of exploring outer space. See Eilene Galloway,
World Security and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 3 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 93, 93-101 (1960).
127. The most seriously discussed doctrine was "national sovereignty." See
Spencer Beresford, The Future of National Sovereignty, 2 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 4 (1959). However, the principle of "state responsibility" also surfaced. For
example, see I.H. Ph. de Rode-Verschoor, The Responsibility of States for the
Damage Caused by Launched Space-Bodies, 1 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 103
(1958).
128. See, e.g., Horsford, supra note 118; Meloni, supra note 118.
129. Teofilo Tabanera, Some Suggestions Concerning an Organization for
Outer Space, 11 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 207, 208 (1968). Such an
organization, says Tabanera, "must be founded on a fundamental basis; the concept
of the universality of space law and everything in it included, be it natural or
artificial, and which has been put to the service of mankind." Id. at 208.
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1. Science and Law: A Failed Equation
The idea of a legal-scientific community was first proposed in the
IISL by Eilene Galloway.' 30  In her view, the aim of such a
community should be "the evaluation of scientific and technological
facts which affect the formulation of law."' 3 ' Afterwards, ironically,
she drew a boundary line between the professionals of both realms.
"It is part of the training of lawyers to evaluate the significance of
facts which make up the social fabric, but it is not usually a part of the
scientists' training to consider the relationship of legal codes to
science."132
The call was repeated by two science-savvy lawyers in the
aftermath of the Outer Space Treaty-Harvey Shiffer and Pieter
Snyders-that a team of "juridical engineers" was needed for the
effective enforcement of the space treaties.' 33 However, they tipped
the scales in favor of scientists, for lawyers and legislators were
inexperienced in legislating space and "[i]t is only the scientist who is
trained to understand Space and its environment ... 134 Shiffer and
Snyders are categorical in this regard:
Legislators must understand that they cannot formulate an effective
SPACE LAW for an environment that they do not undestand [sic].
No lawyer, no member of the Legal Community, and no so-called
political scientist is competent, without the aid of Space scientists
and engineers, to fit man's exploration and exploitation of Space
into terrestrial inventory or law. 
135
They then advise lawyers to "avoid burdening Space with the lengthy
legal terminology of manifestly outdated earth law with its
complicated systems and customs. They should cease 'ex post facto'
130. Eilene Galloway, supra note 33, at 59.
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id.
133. Harvey Shiffer & Pieter Snyders, The Need for Enforcement for
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attempts to devise restraints in accepting progress and Space
technological achievements already in man's inventory." 136
Hence, there should be a team effort by scientists and lawyers.
However, Shiffer's and Snyders' views appear extremely parochial.
Placing laws within the scientific understanding and usability is one
thing and suggesting that the legislator receive tuition on lawmaking
from the scientist is quite another. Shiffer and Snyders were
presumptuous in their contentions and failed to offer a method to
bridge the divide between the scientist and the lawyer and build a
scientific-legal community. In fact, such views tend to generate
friction among the two communities.
George S. Robinson, in an insightful contribution which he read at
the Sixteenth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, places
sentiments such as Shiffer's and Snyders' in the framework of "anti-
intellectualism in the.., basic science[].' ' 137 However, he reminds us
that "[t]he undisciplined disaffection also is with technology[,] where
the discontented are sufficiently astute to recognize the distinction
between the two [disciplines].' ' 138 For Robinson, these oppositions are
false. "There is only one legitimate distinguishing factor between the
so-called natural sciences and social sciences."139 That distinguishing
factor is methodology, in which the natural sciences study matter, and
the social sciences (e.g., law) study behavior patterns. 40 What is, in
fact, required is that science and law should get nearer in terms of
methodology, without any parochial considerations entering the
scheme. 141
136. Id.
137. George S. Robinson, Scientific Renaissance of Legal Theory: The Manned
Orbiting Space Station as a Contemporary Workshop, 16 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 223, 225 (1973).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. To be more specific, science "aim[s] to understand, predict, modify,
and control aspects of the natural and manufactured world, while law seeks current
truth about scientific and other facts of cases in order to serve the much different
goal of justice between parties (as well as other societal goals)." SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW PANEL, A CONVERGENCE OF SCIENCE AND LAW: A
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
LAW PANEL 1-2 (2001).
141. Robinson, supra note 137, at 225.
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One idea inferable from Robinson's account is that the
coexistence of science and law does not mean that scientists and
lawyers need to speak a common language; rather, there is a missing
element-what Steven Yearley calls "the dark matter" n2-from the
scholars' account of their respective disciplines. Robinson, like
Yearley, does not seem to be suggesting that scientists and lawyers
should hand over the dark matter to the other side; he calls for a
concerted effort to develop realistic philosophical templates within
which scientific research can be conducted with a definite focus., 43 In
sum, Robinson advocates a mental posture in which
"anthropocentrically oriented values can change to accommodate
unique models of value formation dictated by vast changes in . . .
scientific knowledge." 144
However, no scholar seems to have espoused Robinson's idea.
Papers on the coexistence of science and law appeared sporadically
thereafter in the colloquia. In the 1985 Stockholm Colloquium, George
P. Sloup, in his "immodest proposal," suggested that lawyers pack
their bags to go into outer space as participants on long space flights' 45
"because they would acquire a much better understanding of the
conditions spacefarers will experience on long-duration flights."' 146 If
this is not possible, they should, at the minimum, take part in space-
flight-oriented training in similar environments at polar bases. Sloup
wanted to take this proposal to the following year's session entitled
"Space Law Teaching,"'147 but this did not happen. In any event,
Sloup's "hollow pragmatism" was miles away from the realization of
a science-law balance.
Although technical as well as legal issues were addressed in
relation to many space activities and applications, none of the attempts
involved balancing technical and legal issues under a proper science-
142. STEVEN YEARLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE
SOCIAL STUDY OF SCIENCE vii (2005) (positing that sociologists' accounting of
contemporary society misses "masses" or "dark matter" relating to how society
incorporates the language of science into its common lexicon).
143. Robinson, supra note 137, at 225.
144. Id. at 225-26.
145. George Paul Sloup, The Training of Astrolawyers: An Immodest
Proposal, 28 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 235, 235 (1985).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 238.
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law framework (such as the one suggested by Robinson). Scholars
and scientists were very often seen to be swapping expertise that most
of the time fell short of the scholarly standards which they generally
maintained in their respective fields.148' At a certain point the science-
law equation lost its significance.
2. Pink Clouds
The awe and excitement generated by the human conquest of
space was such that, from the very beginning of the IISL, scholars
began to envisage legal issues and proceeded to grapple with them.
To a certain extent, this action stemmed from a feeling of inferiority
before the scientists, who were recording one feat after another in
space; the failing science-law equation added fuel to the fire.
However, rather than being futuristic, most of the scholarly
conceptions turned out to be quixotic, a situation which Haley
characterized as a "pink cloud" in the imagination of lawyers.14 9
Ironically, it was Haley himself who sparked a chain of quixotic
thoughts by postulating his concept of meta-law-"do unto others as
they would have done unto them"-in relation to aliens.'50 Indeed,
Shirley Thomas gave serious consideration to Haley's xenological
ideas. 151
Can a legal union of a human being and an intelligent being from
another planet be performed? Such a question never before has
arisen, and considering the magnitude of it, immediate serious
148. This trend was evident even outside the IISL.
149. Andrew G. Haley, Space Age Presents Immediate Legal Problems, 1
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 5, 18 (1958).
150. In Space Law and Government and also in some of his subsequent works,
Haley highlighted the concept of meta-law, which refers to the study and
development of a system of laws that can be applied in all human relationships with
aliens. See HALEY, supra note 31, at 395.
151. Not only Thomas, but also McDougal, were apprehensive that the human
dignity of the aliens might be neglected. See generally McDOUGAL ET AL, supra
note 98, at 974-1021 (discussing the implications of the possible interaction between
humans and non-earth life forms under the rubric of "astropolitics").
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thought should be given-especially in light of the fact that
miscegenation is still forbidden in some areas.
152
There were even more formidable issues.
What other legal problems would the marriage of a human being
with a being from another planet present? If it were biologically
possible for this mating to produce an issue, what would be the
legal standing and moral rights of the issue, if the family were to
remain on earth? 153
Alien-related legal issues were seen even three decades later.
Two space law attorneys foresaw that aliens would be "beings 'with
their own understanding of a kind of rules of behaviour."' 154 Hence
space lawyers should await their arrival with a ready-made code of
conduct fashioned after Haley's meta-law model. 155 However, there is
a considerable dilemma here: what if the aliens "were to desire us to
act in a manner toward them which would be repugnant to our moral
code or sensibilities, scientific or otherwise[?]" 156 In that case, the
Outer Space Treaty must broaden its horizons so as to provide a
balance between the views of human beings and aliens. 157 Martine
Rothblatt, Chairman and CEO of United Therapeutics Corporation,
felt that in the absence of "informed consent," it is perilous to
establish contact with aliens. 58 Such an absence of consent could be
the reason why other galactic intelligences are constantly avoiding
152. Shirley Thomas, A Reexamination of the Approach to Space Law, 10
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 337 (1969).
153. Id.
154. Patricia M. Stems & Leslie I. Tennen, Exobiology and the Outer Space
Treaty: From Planetary Protection to the Search for Extraterrestrial Life, 40 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 141, 148 (1997) (quoting Ernst Fasan, Legal
Consequences of SETI Detection, IAF Paper No. IAA-95-IAA.9.2.04 (1995)).
155. Id. See also M. de las Mercedes Esquivel de Cocca, SETI Draft Second
Protocol, 37 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 233 (1994).
156. Stems & Tennen, supra note 154, at 148.
157. Id. at 149.
158. Martine Rothblatt, Exobioethics-Legal Principles for Interaction with
Non-Terran Species, 42 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 358, 359 (1999) ("any
bother imposed on the life form should only be with its informed consent.").
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contacting us. 5 9 Rothblatt, however, considers her observations only
a facet of space exploration.' 60
Pink clouds were not limited to the aliens issue; they appeared in
the form of behavioral standards for "spacekind," which included
humans, robots, and other "thinking machines,"'61 space
cemeteries, 62 town-planning regulations and a legal order for space
colonies (UNCOPUOS also has a role in this regard), 63 and problems
of citizenship for space inhabitants. 64
3. "Other Regime" Analogies
Space law, as it is generally understood, has three parallels-air
law, the law of the sea, and the Antarctic Treaty. The major similarity
between these branches of law is that all regulate areas which have
somewhat anomalous physical features. In the IISL, the idea of
learning from "other regimes" was first shown by Escobar Faria in the
Third Colloquium in 1960 by way of the Antarctic Treaty as a
prototype for a future covenant for outer space.' 65 The reason why
Faria considered the Antarctic Treaty as model is that the Antarctic,
like outer space, is a res communes omnium; the approach was
considered to be effective, as it provided "a large decrease of power"
of any state in Antarctica. 166 This principle was pursued to a large
159. Id. at 360.
160. Id. at 359.
161. George S. Robinson, Homo Spatialis: A Space Law Dilemma, 22 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 195, 199 (1979) (quoting Yu. A. Petrov, Habitability of
Spacecraft, in III FOUNDATIONS OF SPACE BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 157 (M. Calvin
& O.G. Gazenko eds., 1975)).
162. Mahulena Hofmann, Space Cemeteries: A Challenge for the Legal
Regime of Outer Space, 43 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 380 (2000).
163. John R. Tamm, Outer Space Colonization: A Planned Unit Development,
22 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 217, 218 (1979). In describing space colonies,
Tamm remarks, "[m]edical assistance must be on hand, but should a ready made
security force, a complete legal system with established laws, courts, judges and
others learned in the law be provided?" Id. at 218. If the colony happens to be
international, Tanun considers it illogical to invoke UNCOPUOS. Id.
164. Patricia M. Stems & Leslie Tennen, The Art of Living in Space: A
Preliminary Study, 21 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 245, 253, 254 (1978).
165. Faria, supra note 125.
166. Id. at 124.
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extent in the initial space law negotiations. Nearly three decades later,
in 1988, Jiri Malenovsky noted that although the Antarctic is
geographically identical to outer space in terms of accessibility and
natural resources, there are historical, political, doctrinal, and legal
similarities as well which are wholly applicable in the further
development of space law. 167  However, by then, with five space
treaties in hand, the Antarctic analogy had lost its charm; it was
eclipsed by the law of the sea analogy.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the law of the sea was of interest to the
space lawyers if for no other reason than the geographical similarities
between outer space and the high seas including the seabed.
However, with the successful conclusion of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, space lawyers
paid more serious attention to the sea-space analogy. Guyla Gal
emphasized the new logic of analogies in the special session
Comparison between Sea and Space in the Exploration and
Exploitation Activities of the Twenty Eighth Colloquium in 1985.
The analogy between social phenomena as objects of legal
regulation may support not only application of law, but lawmaking
too. Here analogous phenomena may serve as models, may promote
understanding of correlation to existing ones of new objects of
legislation, and consequently the setting-up of a suitable system of
norms. 
168
167. Jiri Malenovsky, The Antarctica Treaty System-A Suitable Model for the
Further Development of Space Law, 31 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 312, 313
(1988). Malenovsky explains each similarity. Historically, "[b]oth Antarctica and
outer space [were] ... subjects of intense interest to the international community in
the course of the International Geophysical Year .... ." Politically, both the
Antarctica Treaty and treaties on outer space were negotiated under the shadow of
the Cold War; they constituted "confidence builders for East-West relations." In
legal terms, identical schemes were used in the formulation of the Antarctica Treaty
and the Outer Space Treaty: both were first basic and general instruments that were
later to be developed into specific and concretized conventions. Doctrinally, both
regimes have identical governing principles, such as freedom of exploration. Most
of the ideas expressed by Malenovsky are drawn from Chuck Stovitz & Tracy
Loomis, Space Law: Lessons from the Antarctic, 28 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 165 (1985).
168. Gyula Gal, Territorial Sea and Airspace-Passages to Free Spaces?, 28
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 134, 134 (1985).
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However, the drawbacks of analogies were also brought to light.
According to Harry H. Almond, mere similarities between social
phenomena do not constitute a valid ground for analogies.1 69 From a
strategic perspective, space activities are different from activities on
the high seas, and so are policy goals. Principles with policy content
embody the "rule-making" process, which is, in fact, a compromise
between the claims and counterclaims made by states while creating
rules and standards. 170 Although certain activities might fortuitously
share common policy goals as a result of which principles correlate,
this is not the general case. 71 Similar objections were raised by many
commentators in the colloquia. 72
Despite the relatively large number of papers read in the colloquia
on the space-sea analogy, most of the authors were skeptical about a
complete reliance on it. After the 1994 amendments to UNCLOS,
which yielded new commercial policies for the mining and
exploration of sea-bed resources, the space-sea analogy fell into
oblivion.
Among all the branches of law, it was air law from which
analogies were drawn most; air law has thus influenced space law to a
large extent, although this is less apparent in the IISL. 173 In the first
instance, space lawyers attempted to distinguish space law from air
law, which was by then a definite branch of law governing aviation.
They apprehended a conflict of interests between the 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which had long accepted
the fact that "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory"'174 with the nature of space
169. Harry H. Almond, General Principles of Law: An Appraisal of the
Correspondence of Principles Relating to the High Seas to Outer Space, 28 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 118 (1985).
170. Id. at 119.
171. Almond's exposition has a "policy-oriented jurisprudence" touch,
although he does not reject the value of analogies altogether. See generally id.
172. See, e.g., Andrzej Gorbiel, Question of Analogies Between Sea and Space
International Law, 28 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 142 (1985); T.E. Wolcott,
Environmental and Historical Differences Render Sea Law of Little Guidance to
Development of Space Law, 28 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 172 (1985).
173. It is paradoxical that air law's influence was seen in the academic world
more than in the IISL. Also see the section on "Teaching and Students."
174. Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
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activities. 75 On the whole, sovereignty concerns gave air law the
image of a rival in the first few colloquia. 7 6  However, air law
became a subject for analogizing when the potential for space flight
became apparent, although sovereignty concerns persisted.' 77
Scholars began to draw analogies from air law on issues such as
registration of craft, rescue and return of personnel, 178 liability, traffic
control, and so forth. 179 In more recent colloquia, air law analogies
have been cited mostly in connection with the formulation of law and
policies for aerospace vehicles and the pre-flight requirements of
space tourists.
In sum, the general trend in the IISL in connection with the "other
regime" analogies must be termed "situational adjustments" or
characterized as "temporary charm." The analogies served to a certain
extent in offering common ground in some areas and were used at
various levels of abstraction, e.g., principles, strategies, and
applications. From the perspective of the IISL, the constructive side
of analogizing was that it helped dispel scholarly skepticism regarding
the negative effects of overlapping legal regimes.
4. Commercialization: From Rules to Strategies
Commercial concerns entered the IISL, for the most part, in the
aftermath of the Cold War. A realization that "commercialization" is
175. For similar concerns, see Cooper, supra note 124, at 38; Michael
Smirnoff, The Need for a New System of Norms for Space Law and the Danger of
Conflict with the Terms of the Chicago Convention, 1 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 105 (1958).
176. See, e.g., Julian G. Verplaetse, Conflicts of Air- and Outer Space Law, 3
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 145 (1960).
177. In this connection, see V.D. Bordunov, Space Shuttle Flights and
Correlation of Legal Regimes of Air Space and Outer Space, 25 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
OUTER SPACE 211 (1982). Technical aspects are presented in Gyula Gal, The Space
Shuttle Between Air and Space Law, 24 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 103
(1981). See also George P. Sloup, The Relationship of Air Law and Space Law: A
View from the Space Shuttle, Including Its Internal and External Environments, 19
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 202 (1976).
178. I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Search and Rescue in Space Law, 19 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 152 (1976).
179. For a general discussion on the areas of correlation between the two
branches of law, see Martin Menter, Relationship of Air and Space Law, 19 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 164 (1976).
37
Sreejith: Whither International Law, Thither Space Law: A Discipline in Tra
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
368 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
inter alia privatization' 80 made scholars extend the scope of the
existing state-centric space treaties to deal with various facets of
commercialization and the resulting private participation in space
activities.' 8' This appraisal was followed by attempts to redefine
concepts and principles.' 82 As the full potential of space applications
such as telecommunications, satellite remote sensing, satellite
navigation, and space travel became known, scholars flooded the
forum with ideas on business-related rights, e.g., intellectual property
rights,' 83 and claims relating to insurance,184 fair business practices,'85
and societal benefits arising out of space applications. 8 6 Most often
180. Georgy Silvestrov, The Notion of Space Commercialization, 33 PRoc.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 88 (1990) (defining commercialization and presents its
character, subjects, and scope).
181. Karl-Heinz Bocksteigel, Reconsideration of the Legal Framework for
Commercial Space Activities, 33 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 3 (1990). A
thorough review of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its scope in dealing with
commercialization was conducted in the Fortieth Colloquium in 1997, the year
marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty.
182. Terms such as "launching state," "space objects," "astronauts," and
"debris" and principles such as state responsibility and liability and Common
Heritage of Mankind were discussed. See Karl-Heinz Bocksteigel, The Terms
'Appropriate State,' and 'Launching State' in the Space Treaties-Indicators of
State Responsibility and Liability for State and Private Activities, 34 PROC. COLLOQ.
L. OUTER SPACE 13 (1991); Vladimir Kopal, Issues Involved in Defining Outer
Space, Space Object, and Space Debris, 34 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 38
(1991); He Qizhi, Review of Definitional Issues in Space Law in the Light of
Development of Space Activities, 34 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 32 (1991).
183. Bradford L. Smith, An Industry Perspective on Space-Related IPR, 38
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 15 (1995); Carl Q. Christol, Persistence Pays Off:
The Case of Hughes Aircraft Company v. USA, 1976-1999, 42 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
OUTER SPACE 199 (1999).
184. For instance, see David E. Reibel, Space Insurance and the Legal Aspects
of Allocating Risk and Liability among States and Private Entities, 36 PROC.
COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 211 (1993). A national perspective on the issue is given
in Hiroshi Yoshida, Accidents of Space Activities and Insurance, 36 PROC. COLLOQ.
L. OUTER SPACE 221 (1993).
185. Bradford L. Smith, Towards a Code of Conduct for the Exercise of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in Space Activities: Moderation of the
Monopoly?, 39 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 176 (1996).
186. Paul B. Larsen, Use of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
Evidence for Land Surveys: Legal Acceptability, 38 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 285 (1995); Gabriella C. Sgrosso, Sharing of Remote Sensing Data
Concerning Environmental Protection for Public Interest, 39 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
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the potential regulatory framework was also provided. One common
feature evident in those frameworks was the substantial shift in
approach from rules towards strategic arrangements' 87 involving
participation by a multitude of non-state actors. This shift towards
strategies was seen as the imposition of a new world order. Patrick A.
Salin sensed such a shift.
It has become trivial to say that we are at the doorstep of a new
society, a new era, etc.... It is early to typify the developments we
see in our everyday lives and we may need to be more deeply
involved in this new era to clearly take notice of the features of that
evolution. 188
In addition, there was the optimism that a new legal regime was
likely to appear in the near future and that until then some sort of
space legislation might evolve, mostly in the form of national space
legislation and soft law instruments, 89 yet within the general
framework of public international law.
5. Summary
The IISL has been successful in fulfilling the purposes and
objectives set out in its statutes. However, what is of interest here is its
epistemic culture and in particular what the ethos of the body is.
190
OUTER SPACE 94 (1996).
187. See, e.g., Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Space Imaging: Data
Policy and Regulatory Structures, 42 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 278 (1999);
Stephan Hobe & Jana K. Hettling, Challenges to Space Law in the 21st Century-
Project 2001 Plus, 45 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 51 (2002); Bertrand de
Montluc, Space Strategy for Europe, 43 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 254
(2000); C. Heather Walker, In the Giant's Footprint: Bringing MSS Services to
Urban Areas, 44 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 194 (2001).
188. Patrick A. Salin, The New Global Governance Dialogue on International
Communications and Outer Space, 44 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 181, 186
(2001). According to Salin, a new governance dialogue is slowly shaping
international communications along with their outer space dimension. Id.
189. Stephan Hobe, International Space Law in Its First Half Century, 49
PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 373, 379 (2006).
190. See IISL Statutes, http://www.iafastro-iisl.com/additional%20pages/
statutes_l.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). Among the many purposes and
objectives enshrined in the IISL Statutes, those contained in Article 2(g) are of
369
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Scholarship in the IISL sought to progress in tandem with space
activities. The expectation was that it would provide information on
the normative and behavioral patterns space activities might generate
and glimpses into the unexpected and untoward social consequences
of science; 91 its failure to do so has become obvious. The failing
science-law equation prompted lawyers to envisage legal issues which
generated the pink clouds. The perseverance of the scholars created a
legal structure for space and they kept the structure alive by
interpretative maneuvers. Complete reliance on international law and
its principles and values was the norm in the early days, for space
activities were considered to be of common good, transcending
national interests. Hence, whenever a new international legal regime
was found to be successful, scholars vigorously followed its doings
and freely borrowed concepts and principles; a failure of that regime,
however, meant a swift exit on their part. This was particularly
evident in the case of the law of the sea. More recently, a focus on
commercial prospects has prompted an amazing reorientation which
transformed space law in its entirety into a set of strategical working
arrangements.
The whole process is characterized by a nomadism, for the IISL
does not have any academic values to promote or an organized
academic policy; these shortcomings are notwithstanding the
Institute's statutory objectives, however, that are paradigmatic to any
organization. 192 The IISL has failed to put forward space law as a
coherent branch of law and is responsible for a disjunction with many
of the fundamental values of international law which space law
cherished during its initial days. Yet, the organization has a legal
conscience, and is aware of the changing world of law. The most
noteworthy contribution of the IISL is the many thousands of papers
read at its colloquia, which have become references for the serious
scholar.
particular interest. "[F]ostering the development of space law and studies of legal
and social science aspects of the exploration and use of outer space." Id.
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E. Space Law in International Law Textbooks'
93
According to a symposium 94 on the textbook tradition in
international law, textbooks are considered "a treatment of the subject
from which one learns, rather than . . . a source of information for
those who already know a thing or two about the matters of which it
treats." 195  Textbooks in general are criticized as "intellectual fast
food, lacking in both flavor and nutrition."' 96 However, in the context
of a discipline such as international law-a topography where the
mainstream is riddled with dissenters-textbooks are reflections of the
mainstream view. 197
Being a relatively new branch of law, space law did not enter the
scheme of textbook authors of international law until the 1960s,
although monographs on space law had appeared earlier.'
98
Established authors of textbooks and the updaters of the successive
editions of such textbooks have included space law in their general
scheme for international law. In Principles of Public International
Law, 199 Ian Brownlie considers outer space, inter alia, as a concept in
the chapter entitled Common Amenities and Co-operation in the Use
of Resources.200  Yet, nowhere in that five-page treatment does he
193. The idea of analyzing textbooks was suggested to me by Timo Koivurova,
Research Professor, Northern Institute for Environmental and Miniroty Law, Arctic
Centre. The analysis is limited only to the textbooks written in English.
194. See Symposium, A Colloquium on International Law Textbooks in
England, France, and Germany, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 615 (2000).
195. Colin Warbrick, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law.: An
Assessment, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621, 628 (2000).
196. David Mitch, The Role of the Textbook in Undergraduate Economic
History Courses: Indispensable Tool or Superficial Convenience, 50 J. ECON. HIST.
428, 428 (1990). Mitch expresses a doubt at the outset. "Can a textbook adequately
capture the complexity of issues, the subtlety of argument, and the richness of
evidence so as to convey to its readers the character of the discipline?" Id.
197. See Warbrick, supra note 195, at 627 (considering text books to be the
mouthpiece of the mainstream involves generalization, although this view has been
endorsed by scholars such as Warbrick).
198. For information on early space law text books, see generally CHENG,
supra note 48 and CHRISTOL, supra note 63.
199. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed.
1998). Also, see other editions of Brownlie's work: 1st (1966), 2nd (1973), 3rd
(1979), and 4th (1990).
200. Id. at 262-67.
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prefix or suffix outer space with the term "law," although he does give
a succinct description of the clauses of selected treaties on outer space.
Brownlie, however, is justified in his parsimony on the grounds that
his focus is only on cooperation in the utilization of resources201 and
that within that scheme he treats outer space adequately. Indeed,
Brownlie's work is an attempt to present international law as a system
and to avoid treating topics in depth.2 °2 To his credit, inthe five pages
the fundamental principles of international law run as a common
thread knitting all space activities together. Brownlie contends
"[tlhere is no reason for believing that international law is spatially
restricted .... International law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies. 20 3 He does not
leave even a ittle room to speculate that space law might have the
status of a special branch20 4 of international law.
Outer space, like state territory, archipelagoes, and the high seas,
is treated as an object of international law in Oppenheim's
International Law. 20 5 The editors, Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts,
provide a rather extensive treatment of space law, including a brief
survey of all the treaties on space. To uphold Oppenheim's penchant
for "worded principles of law" and its preference over policies,
Jennings and Watts adopt a dogmatic stance distancing them from any
policy considerations for space. 206 Clauses of the five space treaties
supplemented by references to secondary literature occur throughout
the text.
201. Brownlie's description is primarily about the clauses which promote
international cooperation in the utilization of outer space resources, e.g., Article
11(l) of the Moon Treaty, which declares the Moon and its natural resources to be
part of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Id.
202. Warbrick, supra note 195, at 623.
203. BROWNLIE, supra note 199, at 262-63 (internal quotation omitted).
204. The expression "special branch" is used in a technical sense to mean
various subdiscplines of international law such as space law, the law of the sea,
environmental law and trade law, and not to denote just any special activity
regulated by international law.
205. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 826-45 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
206. Id. For support, see Mathias Schmoeckel, The Internationalist as a
Scientist and Herald: Lassa Oppenheim, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 699, 703-04 (2000).
See also Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method,
2 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (1908).
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Malcolm N. Shaw's International Law presents space law in
conjunction with air law.2 °7 Shaw introduces space law as a branch of
law that substantially modified the usque ad coelum concept.
However, he proceeds further with the concept. "It soon became
apparent that the usque ad coelum rule, providing for state sovereignty
over territorial airspace to an unrestricted extent, was not viable where
space exploration was concerned. 20 8 Although states could not find a
precise point separating airspace from outer space, some functional
separating point is marked and it has been agreed that beyond that
point international law and its principles apply.20 9 Next, randomly-
chosen clauses of space treaties are presented as constituting the
regime of outer space. 210  Telecommunications and the related
regulations receive sparing consideration. A bestseller, Shaw's
International Law is known for its comprehensiveness; the fifth
edition has 23 topics. The treatment of most of the subjects gives
consideration to the law school curriculum. Given the book's focus
on students, Shaw's treatment of space law has only a pedagogical
import; the book is, however, inappropriate for assessing the
significance of space law.
In Starke's International Law, space law appears in the author's
discussion on various dimensions and levels of territorial
sovereignty. 21' Positioned within the territorial sovereignty discourse,
Starke's book, upon a survey of selected clauses of the space treaties,
makes certain generalizations as to the fundamentals of international
space law. The book puts forward the view that, given the dynamic
nature of space activities, "space law cannot be static; . . it is
evolutionary."212
Other textbooks in the field, such as Michael Akehurst's A
Modern Introduction to International Law,213 in its three-page
discussion of outer space, maintains that much of the present law on
207. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 284-92 (2d ed. 1986).
208. Id. at 285.
209. Id. at 286.
210. Id. at 286-89.
211. I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-71 (11 th ed. 1994).
212. Id. at 171.




Sreejith: Whither International Law, Thither Space Law: A Discipline in Tra
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
374 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
outer space is contained in the Outer Space Treaty. In another work,
International Law: A Student Introduction, Rebecca M.M. Wallace
hastily presents outer space as a territory not appropriated by any
state, and that "the exploration [of outer space] is to be conducted 'in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations .. 214 Antonio Cassese, in International Law, considers
outer space as one among the spatial dimensions of state activities,
and he gives a pithy account of the law associated with outer space
within the frame of state activities.21 5 In general, emphasis is laid on
the principle of res communis omnium, although Cassese maintains
that it is the ambiguity of treaty clauses which enables major powers
to use outer space primarily for their own interests.
216
All of the textbooks referred to above, regardless of the authors'
scholarly intentions and orientations, include space law in their
structure. In relation to many other branches of international law such
as environmental law, human rights, and law of the sea, the discussion
on space law in the works is brief. In addition, most of the discussions
on space law appear to be doctrinal discourses on, for example,
territorial sovereignty or whilst discussing various sectors of state
activities. None of the discussions breaks the mold of dogmatism; all
the textbooks convey the impression that space law is about five
treaties and a few resolutions. There is some level of homogeneity in
the discussions in that all the works consider the exploration and use
of outer space and the related regulations as inseparable from the
province of international law.
F. Teaching and Students
In law schools, space law is taught as a component of the general
curriculum-mostly as public international law 2' 7-and as a special
214. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDENT
INTRODUCTION 94-96 (1986) (quoting Article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty). The
book is generally considered a companion to any case book on international law.
215. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-64 (2001).
216. Id.
217. There are also a few law faculties where space law is taught as part of
private international law, commercial law, or other subjects. For instance, in the
case of the University of Lapland, the Institute of Air and Space Law is constituted
by the Faculty of Law under the Private International and Comparative Law Chair.
In the University of Cologne, the Institute of Air and Space Law, although, when
44
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss2/4
2008] WHITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW, THITHER SPACE LAW
branch of law in certain institutes. 218 In law schools, it is generally
teachers of public international law who insert space law into their
lectures on state jurisdiction or some other doctrine. If the lecturers
are adherents of any dissenting schools of thought which reject
doctrines, space law is ignored and they present their cause through
topics such as human rights or international security. In special
institutes, space law is connected to air law. All such institutes have
resources and expertise in aviation and space law, which for the most
part are used to attract partnerships from both the aviation and space
industry.21 9 On the academic side, the balance is considerably in favor
of air law, be the focus the syllabus or master's and doctoraldissertation topics.220 In addition, space law courses lay emphasis on
practical issues, leaving the student mostly uninformed about the
normative base governing legal relations as well as other societal
factors influencing the decision-makers. New entrants thus build their
views in a vacuum and approach the issues uncritically; they seek to
under Prof. Karl-Heinz Bbckstiegel, belonged to the Chair of International Business
Law, has now come under the Public International Law Chair. For the history of the
Institute in Cologne, see Horst Bittlinger & Marietta Benk6, Institute of Air and
Space Law University of Cologne 1925-2005, available at
http://www.ilwr.de/index.php?lang=eng&pageid=23.
218. See supra note 10.
219. On the evolution and trends in academia-industry tie-ups, see Shahid
Yusuf, University-Industry Links: Policy Dimensions, in How UNIVERSITIES CAN
PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH 1-25 (Kaoru Nabeshima & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2007).
220. Research institutes, such as the IASL of McGill University, were
established with the purpose of promoting high-quality research in aviation law.
During its initial days, the IASL was patronized by many international aviation
organizations, e.g., the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other
government agencies related to aviation. Even after including space law on its
research agenda, the IASL continues to deal mostly with aviation law. The list of
L.L.M. and doctoral theses presented before the IASL is available at
http://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/alumni/thesisllmI and http://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/alumni/
thesis. For support, see A.B. Rosevear, McGill's Institute of Air and Space Law, 14
U. TORONTO L.J. 257 (1962) and G.N. Pratt, The Tenth Anniversary of the Institute
of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 11 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 290 (1962). For
an overview of space law teaching, see Gyula Gal, Study and Teaching of Space
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formulate rules and build governance structures which are far from the
realities of international law and society.221
Educational activities, such as the Space Law Moot Court
Competition, are held annually and are designed to develop space
advocacy through practice and competition. The moot problem tends
to be very similar from year to year, set to cover mainly the
application of the five space treaties. Students are habituated to
construct their memoranda, in addition to the space treaties, on
characteristic textbook principles, whereby they totally lack any
theoretically- and socially-rooted arguments; seldom does one go
beyond the worded principles of pacta sunt servanda and good
neighborliness. In most of the cases, the team which best presents the
relevant facts and explains the scientific and technical questions in the
light of space treaties make an impact on the judges. In effect, the
venture minimizes space law by embedding in the students' mind the
feeling that space law is an unworthy career option.
Consequently, space law has been unsuccessful in attracting the
finest minds among the new generation scholars in law; the field is
seen as lacking substantial intellectual weight. For this reason, many
students of international law are tempted to stay away from any
serious space law studies. Even those who enter the field are at risk of
internalizing the values of the discipline as they have been forged by
existing institutions; afterward they become the new heroes and are
glorified within the confines of the discipline but lack any real
worldview. On balance, it seems that academic priorities are, to a
great extent, responsible for the decline of space law.
G. A Closed Group
Space law, since its genesis, has had to confront many conflicting
issues and values in its efforts to deal with diverse national interests in
space, all against the backdrop of common interests. The absence of
any academic values and the general goal of "peaceful uses of outer
221. The essence of this argument is drawn from Thio Li-ann, who used it
while referring to a dogmatic bias from which contemporary scholars of
international law suffer. See Thio Li-ann, Formalism, Pragmatism, and Critical
Theory: Reflections on Teaching and Constructing an International Law Curriculum
in a New (Post-Colonial) Asia, 5 SINGAPORE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 327, 340, 343
(2001).
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space" has created a nomadism among scholars in the discipline. Yet,
the pioneers and a few generalist international law scholars, despite
the complexity of the task, preserved and elaborated the discipline in
terms of the norms and values of international law. However, a
perceptible change in the structure of the discipline's beliefs, which
afterward crept into the organizational structures, appears to have
taken space law far away from international law. Ironically, those
who effected the change were not entirely conscious of the cause of
the shift. The discipline eventually developed a closed group,
deemphasized and abandoned its traditional international law base,
withdrew into itself, and stood insulated from any ideological,
doctrinal, and theoretical influences. Space law has never made
methodical use of its traditional concepts and approaches since, and
has subsequently turned into a unique branch of law, one active in its
own ambit.
III. UNIQUE JURISPRUDENCE: A DEFENSE OF SPACE LAW
Had space law been a theoretically and doctrinally robust branch
of law, reviewers might not have laughed at it and there would not
have been room for an unabashed critique; no one mocks the law of
the sea, trade law, or environmental law (although environmental law
displays strikingly similar cultural characteristics to space law).
Various uncomfortable questions encircle space law: How many
principles are left for space law to project as its own? How many of
them are functional in the new world order? How many of the beliefs
and values of space law influence society? Does space law orient its
students to current social demands?
However, answers cannot be put forward in haste. The critique
provided above might be parochial, for it simply presents the
epistemic culture of space law as is observable. In addition, what if
space law has justifications for its present posture? Apparently, space
law needs a chance to be heard. To this end, two contentions are
derived from the above analysis, which are presented as opposing
hypotheses:
(1) Space law ought to be where it is and as it is and should
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(2) Although it has its own unique characteristics, space law is
not a branch of law distinct from international law; there is
some imbalance in the pattern of thinking on space law
that prompts one to think that it is detached from
international law.
Working Method
My working method here will be to integrate selected concepts
and theories of epistemology in order to examine the true nature and
foundation of the discipline. To this end, I first present a defense of
space law as an independent discipline (Hypothesis 1) and, thereafter,
a "counter-defense" arguing that it is to be seen as a facet of
international law (Hypothesis 2).
This approach is based upon the fundamental epistemological
dictum knowledge is true justified belief,222 i.e., knowledge exists
when a belief is true and the cognizor has justification for his or her
true belief. The two hypotheses presented above resemble beliefs.
Although the general position is that truth cannot have many faces, 223
this article assumes that truth is a relative phenomenon-relative in
terms of culture or ontology-and that there can even be true
contradictions. In order to find out the objective reality-the truth-a
debate format is developed in which both hypotheses compete for
justification.224 In a debate, each side believes that what it thinks is
the truth and puts forward justifications for its beliefs.
222. This view forms the basis of epistemology and has been prevalent since
the days of Plato. For a comprehensive survey of the history and development of
epistemology, see generally EPISTEMOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Michael
Huemer ed., 2002) (presenting an anthology of writings about epistemology). The
fundamental view based on truth, belief, and justification has been subject to many
alterations, the most influential critique being Edmund Gettier, Is Justified True
Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963).
223. Gottfried W. Leibniz emphasized that there cannot be anything like true
contradictions. For his argument, see GOTTFRIED W. LEIBNIZ, PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS (Roger Ariew & Daniel Garber eds. and trans., 1989).
224. This debate format is inspired by the Socratic Method, although the article
deviates considerably from the more sophisticated facet of the method. For more on
the Socratic Method and its application, see Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-
Dudley, Meta-Jurisprudence: The Epistemology of Law, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 373
(1996).
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Justification is an art.225 Regrettably, philosophical precision is
impossible in the context of justifying beliefs. As such, the technique
of justification adopted in the present methodology is a hybrid one,
one of belief structures in which one belief is justified by another
belief.22 6 For example, the belief that space law ought to be where it
is and as it is and should remain separated as a unique jurisprudence is
justified by another belief (hereinafter the primary belief), which I
shall discuss shortly (A). However, the basicality of that belief does
not rest upon another belief. In its place, I present a set of supporting
beliefs (hereinafter sub-beliefs), whose basicality comes from the
coherence of its components.227
Once both sides provide justifications for their respective beliefs,
those beliefs will be kept in balance. The aim of the process is to
determine the quantum of truth in the justifications of both sides.
Philosophical precision is lacking in this context, too, but it is not
altogether unworkable. 228 Truth in the present methodology is taken
225. I call it "art" in consideration of the diverse modes of justification,
although each mode is susceptible to criticism. For details, see David Hume, Of
Miracles, in EPISTEMOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 227-49 (Michael Huemer
ed., 2002).
226. This approach draws on foundationalism. For details on knowledge
structures in which one belief is justified by another, see ROBERT AUDI, THE
STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION 80-86 (1993).
227. This method has been borrowed from coherentism, which holds that
beliefs are not justified by a basic belief but from the "epistemic neighborhood" of
the belief. In other words, beliefs form a network, where they are justified on the
merit of their coherence. See Mathias Steup, Epistemology, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2003), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ epistemology. A hybrid of foundationalism and
coherentism is propounded by Susan Haack, which she calls "foundherentism." See
generally SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND ENQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTEMOLOGY (1993). On foundationalism and coherentism, see Robert Audi,
Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism, 2 PHIL. PERSP.
407 (1988).
228. Scholars differ in their perspectives regarding truth. The most influential
among these differing perspectives is the identity theory, which asserts that truth is
when statements or judgments are in accordance with the way things are. However,
even identity theory is subject to interpretations in the form of propositional truth
and material truth. For the various interpretations, see Thomas Baldwin, The
Identity Theory of Truth, 100 MIND 35 (1991); Julian Dodd & Jennifer Hornsby, The
Identity Theory of Truth: Reply to Baldwin, 101 MIND 319 (1992); Robert Stem, Did
Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth?, 102 MIND 645 (1993). For a review of
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as a state, i.e., a state of conformity between a belief and reality.229
However, given the absence of a preconceived reality on the basis of
which conformity can be determined,23 ° that side which offers a
superior symmetry between its beliefs and the justifications for them
will gain merit. The symmetry thus achieved will be the measure of
conformity. An evaluation of conformity between the beliefs and
justifications is made to conclude the article.
A. Disjunction: A Voice of Disciplinary Renewal
The finding that space law has become detached from
international law is not disputed. However, "disjunction" implies
neither a structural weakness nor conceptual erosion of space law. It
is not a disintegration of certain dogmas, beliefs and values and the
construction of new ones; it is a disciplinary renovation by means of
specialization, functional identity, and a new academic and
professional vocabulary. Above all, disjunction is an effort to salvage
the discipline from becoming totally irrelevant in a new world order.
Below, I explain in brief the major changes that law and the legal
profession have undergone in the postmodern wave and argue that the
disjunction of space law from international law reflects these
changes.23'
various theories and a linguistic approach to the concept of truth, see Donald
Davidson, The Structure and Content of Truth, 87 J. PHIL. 279 (1990).
229. This is the core of the identity theory.
230. The advantageous position of a preconceived reality can be found in the
Christian epistemology, where Divine will is considered the only and ultimate truth.
For a critical discussion, see Richard Davis, James Fodor's Christian Theory of
Truth: Is it Christian?, 41 HEYTHROP J. 436 (2000).
231. Throughout the article, the concept of postmodern era/postmodernity is
used in the sense of an axiomatic conviction that invisible, although not
incomprehensible, forces are influencing the world today and that yesterday has
become a relic in the archeology of the mind; tomorrow needs to be built. This
definition is an amalgam of the views of prominent postmodernists such as Jean-
Francois Lyotard, Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?, in
POSTMODERNISM: A READER 46 (Thomas Docherty ed., 1993) ("[P]ostmodern . . .
[is] that which . . . puts forward the unpresentable in presentation"); STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM:
AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 29 (2000) ('[P]ostmodernism [is] . . . total acceptance
of the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic"') (quoting David
Harvey); and commentators. See also Elizabeth Atkinson, The Response Anarchist:
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1. Law and the Legal Profession in a New World Order
Law and the legal profession face considerable challenges in the
rapidly changing global conditions. All aspects of law-theories,
doctrines, pedagogy, research, and patterns of the production of
knowledge-have changed. The changes do not occur in one aspect
in isolation but are pervasive; their nature, however, varies slightly
from one aspect to another because of the conceptual and functional
diversity among them. Changes have occurred mainly in the form of
1) a loss of exclusivity; 232 2) an increased segmentation in the
application of abstract knowledge; 233 and 3) a move towards
specialization.234
Loss of exclusivity is both a progressive and negative concept,235
although it generally connotes forward motion. It has introduced a
multidisciplinary dialectic in every scholarly discourse on law and at
the same time allowed intrusion by nonprofessionals, such as
paralegals, in professional activity. 236 At the academic level, there is
an increasing interest in multidisciplinary studies, which has
Postmodernism and Social Change, 23 BRIT. J. Soc. EDUC. 73, 74 (2002) (listing the
characteristics of postmodemism while refuting the criticisms regarding the
effectiveness of postmodernism). In the article, "postmodernism" and
"postmodernity" have different meanings in the manner articulated by Dunn, who
defines postmodernism as "a set of epistemological, theoretical, and political
responses to postmodernity." See ROBERT G. DUNN, IDENTITY CRISIS: A SOCIAL
CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERNITY 2 (1998).
232. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions are Dead, Long Live the Professions:
Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 L. & Soc'Y REV. 713, 720 (1999).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 726-27. Kritzer calls these changes collectively "post
professionalism." Id. Kennedy expresses a similar sentiment in David Kennedy,
The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics of
Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463, 464 (2001). However, Kennedy
categorizes the changes as a rise of local identities, fragmentation, and
specialization. Id.
235. Anthony Welch, The End of Certainty? The Academic Profession and the
Challenge of Change, 42 CoMP. EDUC. REV. 1, 13-14 (1998).
236. For a detailed discussion on paralegals and their role vis-a-vis professional
lawyers, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998). See also Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting
Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 765 (2003).
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transformed law beyond its traditional foundation.237 Legal discourse
is no longer contextualized in judicial decisions and doctrines. On the
professional side, entry by nonprofessionals 238 and multidisciplinary
practice 239 has challenged the professional autonomy of lawyers. The
trend has prompted lawyers to gain knowledge of other disciplines,
e.g., accounting, engineering, and management.
Segmentation of knowledge and specialization are interrelated in
that specialization is a result of segmentation. One branch of law
where segmentation (commonly known as "fragmentation") has a
serious impact is public international law. 240 Norm conflict 241 and the
emergence of self-contained regimes 242  are examples of
fragmentation. The trend has precipitated the assumption that general
law should be modified or excluded from the administration of special
areas of international law. 243 Special branches in effect initiated a
reform by adopting complex working strategies in place of traditional
rule-based international law. Scholars started to achieve a high level
237. A scholarly project supporting this position is proposed in Edward L.
Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835,
1891-1905 (1988).
238. KRITZER, supra note 236, at 729 (discussing the interplay between
lawyers and non-lawyers in the world of legal advocacy).
239. See generally George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice
within Social History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-professional Competition, 80 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 849 (2006). The concern regarding multidisciplinary practice is
expressed in passing in D. Michael Guerin, The World is Flat ... and What That
Means to You, 78 Wis. LAW. 2 (2005).
240. For a detailed discussion on the fragmentation of international law, see
Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (A/CN.4/L.682) (2006)
[hereinafter ILC REPORT]; Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a
Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 27
(2005); Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi & Piivi
Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 553 (2002).
241. Lindroos, supra note 240.
242. See generally Anja Lindroos & Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera
of 'Self-Contained Regimes' International Law and the WTO, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
857 (2005).
243. But see ILC REPORT, supra note 240, para. 129.
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of specificity in their knowledge in order to deal with new challenges.
From such a perspective, fragmentation is a phenomenon of
specialization.
Special branches of knowledge have created special areas of
practice, but practitioners have to face the challenges of
nonprofessionals, e.g., paralegals, posed by the loss of exclusivity. In
order to combat the situation, practitioners need to be super-specialists
and in this process they seek the help of law schools, which impart
advanced professional skills far beyond those of nonprofessionals.
Universities also adapt by introducing courses of vocational relevance,
building closer university-business partnerships and adding an
instrumental flavor to teaching priorities.244 In sum, the process
involved is a reawakening, followed by changes in the "professional
vocabulary, ' ' 245 patterns of discourse, structure of knowledge and
institutions, and methodology.
2. The "Progressive Sensibility" of Space Law2 4 6
In its first era, space law functioned as a branch of international
law characterized by a treaty regime that aimed at ensuring peaceful
uses of outer space for the benefit of humankind. However, in the
wake of the commercialization of outer space, and prompted by the
forces of globalization, space law started responding to continuing
global changes. In the initial response, a "hybrid public-private
[commercial space] environment, ' 247 whereby the state provides
infrastructure and incentives to the private sector to compete in the
market, replaced the state governed and state controlled system.
Consequently, what had been a defense and research and development
244. For support, see generally Yusuf, supra note 219.
245. Specifically on the professional vocabulary of international lawyers and
the trends therein, see David Kennedy, The Twentieth-Century Discipline of
International Law in the United States, LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 386
(Austin Sarat et al., 2002).
246. I have coined the expression "progressive sensibility" on the analogy of
Kennedy's "internationalist sensibility" and "renewalist sensibility." My
understanding of the renewalist wave in international law is to a certain extent
shaped by Kennedy's treatment of the subject in David Kennedy, A New World
Order. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
330 (1994).
247. Gabrynowicz, supra note 65, at 1051.
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orientation in space activities shifted towards a market orientation.248
New actors in the space sector developed new strategies and policies
to facilitate the development of the market, 249 resulting in a substantial
change in the pattern of knowledge production and focus of research.
To be in the race, space lawyers must master the art of corporate
management and indulge in the rhetoric of business. They compete
with management professionals in areas such as identifying and
analyzing an industry's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats, and assisting in the formulation of optimal policies. In the
process they also maintain a social perspective by considering the
political, legal, and technological influences likely to impact the
industry. Modern space lawyers have come far from the mold of
ivory tower theoreticians preoccupied with doctrines; instead, they
rightly understand society with its present realities and use that
understanding to organize technology for the progress of the world.
On the academic side, throughout the formative and functional
years of space law, scholars practiced, professed, and defended the
ideals and conceptions of international law. The general principles of
international law were considered the factor which fastened space law
to the "system ' 250 of international law, and space law was interpreted
and applied in accordance with those principles. 2 1 However, in
recent years, space law scholars have started to share the common
feeling of discontent with the institutions, norms, and principles that
govern the international system. 252 They understand their pivotal role
248. See generally Hanneke L. Van Traa-Engelman, Commercialization of
Space Activities: Legal Requirements Constituting a Basic Incentive for Private
Enterprise Involvement, 12 SPACE POL'Y 119 (1996).
249. For a comprehensive proposal in this connection with insights drawn from
the aviation industry, see PHILIPPE MALAVAL & CHRISTOPHE BENAROYA,
AEROSPACE MARKETING MANAGEMENT (2002). See also Mike W. Papin & Brian
H. Kleiner, Effective Strategic Management in the Aerospace Industry, 70 AIRCRAFT
ENGINEERING & AEROSPACE TECH. 38 (1998).
250. International law has been characterized as a "system" by many scholars,
the most prominent being Ian Brownlie.
251. Such rules for interpreting international law are provided in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969. See also Mohammed
Bedjaoui, Classicism and Revolution in the Elaboration of the Principles and Rules
of Space Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 441-62 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995).
252. Bedjaoui, supra note 251, at 443. Bedjaoui observes: "Over some 20
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in leading space law to the new world order and in that role the futility
in clinging to the outmoded concepts of international law. They
naturally ask, "How can international law provide the stage, when it
itself is disorganized"-with its fragmentation, overlapping regimes,
proliferation of international tribunals with overlapping jurisdictions,
and lack of unity in discourse? To what extent will the practice of its
doctrines enable young graduates to advance space law and meet the
demands of the new market society? Scholars, quite obviously, have
opted to shun everything that stands in opposition to the discipline's
advance to the new world order. Accordingly, students are kept away
from hollow doctrines and the contextless application of principles;
instead, they are vocationally trained to serve the needs of space-
related industries such as transportation, telecommunications, remote
sensing, and tourism. Academic courses have replaced coursebook-
study with practical problems, e.g., case studies and short-term
industrial placements. Universities have also built research consortia
to meet the demands of the market. In sum, the application,
development, and exploration of knowledge has assumed an
unprecedented dimension.
All of these changes characterize the "progressive sensibility" of
space law-a rational yearning to cross the threshold into a new
world-in the larger scheme of disciplinary reform. Radical steps
such as closing the group to certain external influences to which the
discipline was previously responsive, de-rooting traditional
foundations, and restructuring practice and the pattern of discourse
point to the fact that space law, like all branches of knowledge, is in a
transition from one world order to another new one. When world is at
the trough of a cycle, it is quite natural for branches of knowledge to
experience an internal agitation amid a reformist consciousness.
The assertion that the changes one witnesses in space law are an
inevitability imposed by the world order on all branches of knowledge
and that space law has adequately modified its contents and culture to
accommodate the global conditions justifies the hypothesis that space
law ought to be a closed group and should remain separated from
years, the international community has conceived and elaborated a space law with
fundamental principles and rules of conduct; the purpose here is to try to decode
these principles and rules, to determine the objectives which explain their selection,
to see whether they meet lasting needs or temporary requirements in the conquest of
space, and perhaps to explain a certain current trend towards disillusionment." Id.
385
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international law as a unique jurisprudence. Below (in B, C, and D),
the article presents a set of sub-beliefs justifying this assertion. The
sub-beliefs, even though they support the assertion independently, are
more compelling in combination.
The first sub-belief is that receptiveness to change is an inherent
characteristic of space law. I demonstrate this with reference to the
responsiveness shown by the discipline in the past, mainly to policy,
technology, and ideology. My arguments also explain why space law
did not heed lessons of the Jenks-McDougal debate.
B. Receptiveness: An Inherent Quality
Law is a social institution that develops on its own internal
dynamics.253 The internal dynamics of law work through interactions
between various structures and actors, e.g., courts, legislatures,
lawyers, and scholars. Internally, law is rational, meaning that it is
"structured according to standards of analytical conceptuality,
deductive stringency, and rule-oriented reasoning., 254 But law and
legal systems are not insulated from external influences, which "are
selectively filtered into legal structures and adapted in accordance
with a logic of normative development. " 255 In practice, an external
stimulus acts upon the internal dynamics, resulting in a legal change
and substantially modifying the social order, a phenomenon which
Gunther Teubner has termed a model of "socio-legal covariation.2 5 6
Generally, it is the forces of politics, ideology, and intellectual
movements inter alia that act as the stimuli for legal change.
As regards space law, in the past the discipline has shown a high
degree of receptiveness to such forces, in particular technological
developments. When space technology became the focal point of
253. This is the neo-evolutionary view of law. For neo-evolutionists, law
changes in reaction to its own impulses. The prominent scholars who share this
view are Niklas Luhman, Jtirgen Habermas, Philippe Nonet, and Philip Selznick.
For details, see generally PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD REsPONsIvE LAW (1978) (describing a cross-sectoral
emphasis on the relationship between law and social order).
254. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
L. & SoC'Y REv. 239, 253 (1983) (referring to Habermas).
255. Id. at 249 (reviewing neo-evolutionist scholarship).
256. Id. at 257.
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states' common expectations, there emerged conflicts of interests
between technologically advanced countries and those aspiring to
comparable levels. What was an emerging branch of law came to
incarnate a "law of outer space" to reduce the conflict of interests by
assuming functional responsibilities such as regulation, control, and
effective management of technology, and afterward sculpt normative
structures on the basis of these functional responsibilities. Although it
emerged in response to an external stimulus-a technological boom---
space law has since substantially broadened the parameters of law in
general and its pattern of thinking, e.g., the idea of humankind as a
legal subject has provided a disciplined consideration to the social and
cultural needs of humanity in an unprecedented manner. In addition,
by drawing on the many common-interest-oriented principles, the
institutional structures of space law have evoked a sense of
"community" among the states in a more vivid and solid manner. 257
These instances, on the whole, exemplify the internal dynamics of law
reacting to the external stimulus of a technological boom.
Similar reactions to policy and politics are observable in the past,
particularly when Cold War witnessed a fluctuating balance of power
and technological superiority between the superpowers. With the
proliferation of the Soviet arsenal, the United States contrived several
defense initiatives, such as "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD).258
For international law, MAD rendered meaningless "[t]he notion of
necessity as one of the traditional cumulative criteria of
lawfulness., 259 However, there circulated several misgivings at the
U.S. policy desks about the safety of MAD, prompting them to seek
alternatives. One alternative that gained popularity was "mutual arms
control,, 260  which prompted the superpowers to settle for
demilitarization. This strategic stance inspired the ongoing
negotiations for a space treaty in UNCOPUOS; the protection from
257. Nicolas M. Matte, Institutional Arrangements for Space Activities: An
Appraisal, 6 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 439, 455 (1981).
258. For details of the MAD doctrine, see Nicolas G. Fotion, Mutual Assured
Destruction, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR AND ETHICS 320-24 (Donald A. Wells
ed., 1996).
259. W. Michael Reisman, International Law After the Cold War, 84 AM. J.
INT'LL. 859, 860 (1990).
260. ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND RESEARCH GUIDE 3-7 (1987).
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any "aggressive military" provided in Article IV of the OST carries
the marks of this strategic position. Currents of superpower politics in
this context infiltrated into the internal structures of law, putting space
law onto a new normative course.
Receptiveness to Intellectual Movements: The Failure of Policy-
Oriented Jurisprudence
Earlier in this article, space law was criticized for its insensitivity
to intellectual movements using the example of McDougal's policy-
oriented jurisprudence, which was a critique of what was at the time
the generally accepted pattern of thought in international law.
However, while accepting that space law was indeed insensitive to the
movement, it is submitted that this insensitivity owed to the erroneous
design of the policy-oriented jurisprudence.
Policy-oriented jurisprudence is an intellectual movement which
addressed international law in general and space law (and certain other
branches of international law) in particular. An intellectual movement
is said to have impacted a discipline when the ideas and strategies for
the promotion of the movement influence and adequately alter the
beliefs, values, and methodologies of the discipline.2 6' The extent of
impact generally depends on a correlation between the objectives,
ideas, and method of advocacy of the movement and the normative
state of the discipline.
Policy-oriented jurisprudence, whose overriding goal was the
dignity of men and women in an increasingly universal public
order,262 offered a "comprehensive, contextual, problem- and policy-
oriented analysis of social problems and the legal responses designed
to address them., 263 However, the promotion of the theory by its
proponents evoked the feeling that international law (space law in
particular) was being transformed, by altering the very nature of its
knowledge, towards the power-oriented realist paradigm. 264 It is thus
no wonder that Phillip Allott sensed in McDougal's language "a
261. This impact of an intellectual movement on a discipline differs to a certain
extent from the impact intellectual movements have on a society. For a presentation
in this vein, see Stuart A. Umpleby, The Design of Intellectual Movements, PROC. OF
INT'L SOC'Y FOR SYS. SCl. (2002).
262. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 98, at v.
263. Wiessner & Willard, supra note 95, at 97.
264 See PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD xviii (1990).
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rebuke to traditional international law., 265  "[There is] extreme
subjectivism [in] ... writing, which is assertoric rather than didactic;
concerned almost to the point of being passionate. It is unashamedly
and intentionally value-laden."' 266
In the same vein, policy-oriented jurisprudence met with stiff
resistance from space law scholars, who were accustomed to a rule-
oriented approach and whose faith was embedded in positivist
thinking. They could not perceive McDougal's theory as anything but
advocacy of realist thinking in space law- and policy-making.
However, had McDougal's theory been presented as a set of
intellectual techniques to detect the community process and in that
way facilitate the shaping of relevant policies for a just world public
order in space, scholars would have been convinced of the
methodological rigor of the theory in effectively advancing the rule-
oriented system. The theory's crusader image, however, eclipsed its
intellectual pragmatism and utility.
This section set out to illustrate that receptiveness is an inherent
quality of space law, yet this is not to say that the discipline is
particularly vulnerable to sweeping changes. Space law displayed a
sense of calculated adaptivity by maintaining a balance between the
actions of the catalysts-a technological boom, political trends, and
intellectual movements-and the normative requirements of the age.
Its resistance to the campaigning of policy-oriented jurisprudence
illustrates its rational selectivity. These defenses do not, however,
render space law a criticism-free zone; it has been accused of moving
towards complex strategies, thereby jettisoning not only its rule
orientation but even its communitarian focus. The next section
illustrates that, in making such a move, which is a receptive one, space
law has built a rational coherence with the free-market ideology of a
modernizing world. It is this coherence which justifies the strategic
orientation of space law.
C. When in the Market, Be a Marketer
With the end of the Cold War, economic systems all over the
world entered a transition from state-controlled planned economies to
265. Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45
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market economies,267 which have their theoretical underpinnings in
neoclassical economics. Among the many axioms of neoclassicism,
268
focused as it is on the maximization of wealth as the ultimate
objective of social organization, the ones that. gained a strong foothold
in the contemporary market economies were the emphasis on
efficiency and unfettered markets. Whereas efficiency is a means to
increase wealth: "[p]olicies, which do not promote efficiency ... will
be opposed,, 269 and unfettered markets promote the maximization of
consumer preferences in relation to goods and services and favor
competition.270
In governing modern market economies, power is transferred
from the state to the business sector-the standard neoclassical model.
In this model, "there are markets for everything, now and for the
future; everybody knows everything, and they know the same things;
and there are no public goods, no externalities, no transaction costs,
and no increasing returns. ' 271 State intervention is favored only in
exceptional cases, e.g., providing a suitable legislative code
guaranteeing private ownership and ensuring effective competition
and free exchange of goods, ensuring law and order, military defense
and a welfare system, entering into agreements of various types with
267. See, e.g., EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES: GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (Grzegorz W. Kolodko ed., 2003) (capturing the causes and impacts
of, as well as national and regional perspectives on, the transformation).
268. The assumptions of neoclassical economics are: "1) all human behaviour
is individualistic; 2) all human behaviour is exclusively self-interested; 3) all human
behaviour is rational and humans are no more than "rational utility maximizers"; 4)
welfare is merely and wholly the satisfaction of an individual's material preferences;
5) efficiency is the exclusive measure of desirability; and 6) unfettered markets are
the best way to permit people to achieve their self-interested objectives and achieve
allocative efficiency." Benedict Sheehy, The Importance of Corporate Models:
Economic and Jurisprudential Values and the Future of Corporate Law, 2 DEPAUL
Bus. & COMM. L.J. 463, 470 (2004). Sheehy derives the assumptions from the
seven laws set out in DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE
OF ECONOMICS 51 (1992).
269. Sheehy, supra note 268, at 472.
270. See id. at 472-73.
271. Adam Przeworski, The State in a Market Economy, in TRANSFORMING
POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL ECONOMIES 411, 412 (Joan M. Nelson et al. eds.,
1997) (appraising and evaluating scholarly perspectives on the role of the state in a
market economy and proposing methods of effective state intervention in markets).
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other. countries, and implementing political decisions.272 The state is
not allowed to take part in any of the internal market processes, which
are sustained by the effective strategies and marketing practices
adopted by firms. Such strategies pertain to ensuring long-term
viability by modifying products and services, successful execution of
management decisions, performance enhancement, pricing techniques
and customer-focused promotions, to name a few.273 In order to
effectively shape and implement strategies, firms require essential
information to be at the disposal of key decision makers; they look at
professionals to fulfill this need.
In the early 1980s, new space-inspired technologies were found to
have high market potential, one example being telecommunications,
with its profound implications for everyday life. Subsequently, new
interest groups, which Nathan C. Goldman collectively calls the
"citizens' space lobby," were formed.274 They advocated once-
outlandish ideas of bringing space to society. "[T]hese space groups
often represent the first expressions of later careers in space
business." 275 Goldman goes on to capture the general mood at the
time:
Many entrepreneurs in start-up companies and engineers in
established ones receive much inspiration from their memberships
in these [groups]. Existing trade associations such as Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA) and new organizations such as the
Space Business Roundtable (Houston, Texas) signify the growing
legitimacy of space advocacy. These people are now part of a new
reality ....276
By the 1990s, most space activities had taken on a market
orientation.277 The flood of space activities into the marketplace
272. ARNE JON ISACHSEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET ECONOMY 4
(1992).
273. Kwaku Appiah-Adu, Marketing in Emerging Countries: Evidence from a
Liberalized Economy, 15 MKTG. INTELL. & PLAN. 291, 293-98 (1997) (articulating
the strategies required for Ghana).
274. NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC 111 (1988).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 112.
277. Id. at 112-13. Goldman classifies market-oriented space activities into
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rendered state-centric space law inadequate for a market, leaving
states the role of overseeing and safeguarding the market. One group
of scholars indulged in interpretative theorizing so that the scope of
existing space treaties would be adequately broadened to include
private participation in space-related markets. 8  They persevered
with the old knowledge structures of space law and upheld the
interventionist role of states in markets. The rest of the scholars in the
field, who had already broken through the shell of professional
exclusivity, traversed the threshold of the commercial space activities
and followed the complex legal and strategic process of the markets.
Their proficiency in areas such as market analysis, risk assessment,
and strategic counseling would remedy the uncertain regulatory
environment in the markets.
The splitting up of space law scholars into these two camps, while
creating a two-fold discipline, maintained a complementarity between
space law and the state-supervised and market-oriented nature of
space activities. In tune with the normative and structural changes,
the academic and research institutions in space law adopted the
vocabulary of business for the dissemination of knowledge, which was
criticized as misrepresenting the reality to students. The next section
proves those criticisms to be ill founded.
D. Progressive Thinking: Episteme and Pedagogy in Space Law
Episteme
Two types of criticisms were voiced against space law academia:
1) the IISL was dysfunctional and 2) academic institutions were
five sectors: 1) the communications satellite industry; 2) transportation; 3) services;
4) earth- and space-based installations; and 5) remote sensing and manufacturing.
Id.
278. See, e.g., Edward A. Frankle, Once a Launching State Always the
Launching State? A Needless Conflict of Treaty Regimes, 44 PROC. COLLOQ. L.
OUTER SPACE 32 (2001); Dimitri Maniatis, Spring Break 2023-The Law Governing
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: From State Responsibility to
Private Liability, 22 ANNALS AIR AND SPACE L. 369 (1997) (suggesting that the
existing liability regime adapts to modem realities by a unification of private law);
Julie C. Easter, Sea of Tranquility: The Effect of Space Tourism on Outer Space Law
and World Policy in the New Millennium, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 349
(2003) (highlighting the inadequacies of existing treaties and proposing a new
framework for space tourism and proprietary rights in space).
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promoting the internalization of wrong values. The dysfunctional
nature of the IISL lay in its nomadic progress, its failure to bring
coherence and its promoting disjunction with international law. The
IISL clearly displayed behavior that could give rise to these
accusations, but its actions have been erroneously interpreted.
Interpretations have been made based on a presumption that the IISL
is a movement-revolving around a manifesto-which has strayed
from its ideals. Expectations that a coherent body of thought or a
shared set of core values among individual viewpoints would emerge
from the IISL are also a result of this presumption. However, the IISL
is quite far from being a movement; it is in all probability an epistemic
community, which according to Peter Haas, is "a network of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue-area." 279 Article 2 of the IISL Statute
succinctly endorses that it is an epistemic community. "The purposes
and objectives of the Institute [the IISL] shall include: (g) The conduct
of such other activities as may be considered desirable in fostering the
development of space law and studies of legal and social science
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space.,
280
In its work, the IISL has displayed the characteristics of an
epistemic community by providing actors in the space sector with
optimal policy choices (particularly evident during the
demilitarization negotiations in the 1960s), depictions of global public
interests in space, information on the extent to which law can
safeguard as well as encourage technological innovations, and
accounts of law and its interrelation with the scientific process.
281
Given that the existential logic of any epistemic forum is to provide
interpretations of social and physical phenomena and thereby remove
intenatinal282
uncertainties in international policy coordination, a singular focus
on issue areas cannot be expected of them. In the case of the IISL,
even if its thinking has tended towards the unusual-its concern for
279. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (detailing the structure, role, and
behavioral characteristics of epistemic communities).
280. IISL Statutes art. 2(g), http://www.iafastro-iisl.com/additional%20pages/
statutes_l.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
281. See generally id.
282. See Haas, supra note 279, at 3-4.
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aliens-the justification stands that it was consideration for the public
excitement over and awe of space exploration that prompted many
scientific agencies to turn to the institute for information on the
societal impact of deep exploration of the universe. Finally, as
regards the shift from one analogy to another, cited as an instance of
nomadism in the approach of the IISL, analogizing in the IISL was not
the standard practice of identifying with another regime and
perceiving similarities but a methodical reckoning in that analogies in
the space law context have helped more in finding out the differences
between two regimes than in determining similarities. It was an
awareness of the normative gap between the regimes that prompted
scholars to discard the old analogies and look for new ones.
Pedagogy
In the postmodern era, knowledge structures underwent
substantial transformations, with the art of rhetoric and patterns of
academic discourse being no exceptions. The validity of knowledge is
determined by asking question such as "Is it true?"; "Is it
marketable?"; "Is it sellable?"; 283 Can it be quantified? In other
words, the validity of knowledge is determined on the basis of
economic efficiency and effectiveness, a criterion which Jean-
Francois Lyotard calls "performativity. '"284 These changes are
reflected in various curricular solutions and teaching methods and set
educational institutions altogether on a competitive track.285
Under the postmodern influence, as the ideals of science changed
into technological dynamism, space law sought to restructure its
knowledge and application. As a first step, the IISL carried out an
appraisal of the teaching methods used by various institutions.286
Most of the contributors at a session dedicated to the issue
recommended broadening the scope of the curriculum in order to
come to terms with the new technological and commercial realities.
Consequently, space law courses were tailored to meet the needs of
283. Harland G. Bloland, Postmodernism and Higher Education, 66 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 521, 536 (1995) (quoting Jean-Francois Lyotard, THE POSTMODERN
CONDITION 108 (1984)).
284. Id.
285. See id. at 538-39.
286. In this connection, see various contributions to the special IISL session
Space Law Teaching and the History of Space Law, 29 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER
SPACE 205 (1986).
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the industry with a large dose of practically and strategically oriented
training. A new awareness of current market realities, rather than
communitarian perspectives, was imparted to the students, which
prompted them to take up competitive careers in astronautics; it is
quite obvious that such students decide to stand outside the bounded
conventions of social enquiry. This is to say that wrong values were
instilled into the students by space law institutes: the institutions
simply responded effectively to the demands of the learners for useful,
technical, and market-related knowledge.
In the meantime, the loss of state authority in the postmodern
world led to a substantial reduction in state funding for higher
education, prompting many institutions to mobilize funds from
external sources such as multinational corporations to support their
research. The outcome of this trend, according to Harland G. Bloland,
has been "that research is judged on its ability to aid in the
competitive position of the multinational organization[]. '287 In such a
situation, space law institutes need to build effective networks and
partnerships with industries. To win the confidence of industry
partners, institutes need to show their expertise in market strategies
rather than engage in value-loaded conceptualization.
E. Methodological Summary and Conclusion
The anomalous normative and functional characteristics displayed
by space law derive from a natural impulse to transcend the present
realities of the world order and to create a paradigmatically superior
branch of law. This is the primary belief pursuant to which space law
claimed to be a unique jurisprudence. 288  The primary belief is
supported by three sub-beliefs: 1) that the rational adaptivity towards
the catalysts of change in the past guarantees the progressive
sensibility of space law; 289 2) that each functional change space law
has effected can be attributed to a global force; 290 and 3) that every
structural change-in pedagogy as well as episteme-has been
effected on the basis of certain value systems (in the present context,
287. Bloland, supra note 283, at 541.
288. See supra Part III.A. 1-2.
289. See supra Part III.B.
290. See supra Part III.C.
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postmodernism). 291 Even though each sub-belief can be justified on
its own merits, what supports the primary belief is the coherence of
the three, which can be read to mean that space law has a built-in
survival mechanism to protect itself against any crisis due to change.
It is the dynamics of this survival mechanism that have inspired the
"progressive sensibility" of space law and subsequently moved the
discipline to close its doors to certain influences likely to be
detrimental to its functioning. In its new posture, space law is
internally robust and externally dynamic and deserves a dignified
place in intellectual and educational forums.
IV. A COUNTER-DEFENSE
The arguments put forward on behalf of space law are based on
the conviction that in the modern world there has been an inevitable
and steady deterioration of society and its institutions, a complex state
of affairs which international law has proved absolutely inadequate in
comprehending and rectifying. It is the resulting disarray that
prompted space law to seek normative escape routes. However, in
response to the arguments made on behalf of space law, neither the
contentions regarding the jumbled state of affairs of the contemporary
world order are disputed nor is space law's normative course or
structural changes questioned. What is disputed is the assertion that
space law has turned into a sheltered group and entirely dissociated
itself from international law.
This part of the article argues that the waves of global change
were detected by a group of scholars in international law before the
change impacted the special branches of that field. Following the lead
of its scholars, international law has acquiesced, streamlined its ways
of thinking and organized its functions accordingly, notwithstanding
the presence of numerous scholars in the middle of the road. The
renewal program of international law has reallocation schemes for
virtually every one of its components, including the role of treaties,
the tasks of international organizations, terminologies, and the nature
and functions of special branches. The transformations within and in
the operation of space law have taken place in harmony with the
renewalist program of international law. If there linger any
291. See supra Part III.D.
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misgivings on the relationship between space law and international
law, they are attributable to a conventionalist understanding of the
relationship between international law and its special branches; the
bond between international law and space law stands on a new
footing.
A. The Renewalist Program of International Law
The ideas and beliefs of international law have a glorious history
in the sense that notwithstanding the sporadic turbulence of war, there
was a sort of symmetry in the ideas governing the relationship
between states. The symmetry took the form of effectiveness of
principles, the strength of norms, the harmony between social and
legal values, the determinacy of law and the robustness of the legal
systems. One significant reason for this symmetry was the low
intensity in state interactions, which never required high performance
from those ideas. With the intensification of state interactions the
classical ideas became dysfunctional, and the theoretical constructs
held up by such ideas started to crumble. An extensive reform began
in the early twentieth century that saw the creation of institutions,
codification of doctrines, and promotion of formalism, 292 with the
supporting ideas of interstate relations recharged/replaced to serve the
new arrangements. By the latter half of the century, even with new
structures and rules and an expanding topography, international law
had left its past glory-the symmetry-behind it. It started to
experience an inexplicable friction in its functioning-overlapping
regimes and proliferating institutionalism (with overlapping
mandates), which resulted in the antiquation of fundamental values,
indeterminacy of principles, fragmentation, and inconsistency between
practice and established values. Innumerable odd questions and
bizarre concepts related to collective security, free trade, self-
contained regimes, global governance, and so forth, floated around the
periphery of international law. 2 93 For the first time, the cynical voice
292. David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History
of an Illusion, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 385, 390-97 (1996). According to Kennedy,
the renewalist image of the twentieth century for international law is based on a
rejection of the significance of the nineteenth century. Id.,
293. Deborah Z. Cass, Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship
in International Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 341, 342 (1996) (introducing the reason
397
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of a "legal left" or a "Newstream" concerned over the utility and
effectiveness of existing knowledge and institutions of international
law was heard.294
Given the relativist nature of the Newstream approaches, no off-
the-rack program was available, 295 although transcendental visions for
inner development 296 or a critical project 297 occasionally flashed
across the scholarly horizon. Despite the variations in approach,
disenchantment with doctrines or an emphasis on the mode of rhetoric
was, however, a frequent and widespread phenomenon among the
Newstreamers. With reference to these two characteristics of the
Newstream, the next section reveals the new relationship that has
come to exist between general international law and its special
branches-space law in particular-and thereby affirms the primary
belief that the "progressive sensibility" emphasized by space law has
been dictated by international law.
for the emergence of a Newstream scholarship within the overall articulation of the
Newstream agenda).
294. What constitutes the legal left is a matter of doubt. Generally, Critical
Legal Theorists ("the Crits"), who campaign for a deconstruction of existing
structures of law, are considered the legal left. However, Thomas Franck has
recently juxtaposed the Crits with the realists, who attacked legal formalism and put
forward an interest-based theory of law. Franck asks, if the legal left is understood
as a group of critics of traditionalism such as the realists, "where does that position
the [so called] left?" Thomas M. Franck, Is Anything "Left" in International Law?,
1 UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 59, 62 (2005). For a seminal work on Critical
Legal Studies, see ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1983). For an insightful review of the early critical legal scholarship, see Alan
Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1986).
295. Koskenniemi describes the Newstream as "best understood as a critical
sensibility that examines international law from a wide range of intellectual strands:
philosophy, political theory, sociology, anthropology, cultural and women's studies
and so on in order to reassess its meaning, contemporary relevance and future role."
Martti Koskenniemi, Preface to the Special Issue: New Approaches to International
Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 337, 340 (1996). Koskenniemi, however, does not
consider the Newstream to be a movement or a program. Id.
296. See generally ALLOTT, supra note 264.
297. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS (2005).
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1. Lex Specialis and Lex Generalis: Beyond Doctrines
It is the general understanding that doctrines link special branches
to general international law.298 This relationship operates on the basis
of the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali.299 However, when
doctrines which have been the adhesive die out in a new world order,
the linkage is certain to rupture. Contemporary international law
scholarship is resplendent with writings analyzing the extent of the
rupture, although the analyses end with the consolation that there is
still life left in the doctrines. However, progressive-minded scholars
do not anguish over the fate of doctrines; for them rhetoric/discourse
patterns are the factor uniting isolated "units" of international law into
a coherent whole.300 This view retains the traditional understanding
that international law is a "structural whole," 30  with units30 2 or
298. Simma and Pulkowski have demonstrated that this is in fact the reality.
They demonstrate the linkage between general international law and self-contained
regimes (the expression "special branches" has become somewhat archaic) such as
the WTO, EC law, diplomatic law, and human rights using the principle of state
responsibility. They conclude that "general international law provides a systemic
fabric from which no special legal regime is completely decoupled." Bruno Simma
& Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in
International Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 483, 529 (2006). Rosalyn Higgins supports
this position, noting that experiments within the International Court of Justice have
shown that no special branch can be litigated outside the domain of international
law. Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight
Courtroom, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 121, 122 (2001).
299. On the concept, application, and functional difficulties of this maxim with
respect to international law, see generally Lindroos, supra note 240.
300. David Kennedy has reformulated rhetorical modes as the factors uniting
international law with units such as "state," "politics," and "international society."
See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIs. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1988).
301. Piaget defines a structure as "a system of transformations.., the notion of
structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of
transformation, and the idea of self-regulation." JEAN PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM 5
(Chaninah Maschler trans., 1971). The idea of law being a structure has been
recognized since Hans Kelsen. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 123-61 (RUSSELL & RUSSELL 1961) (1945). However, in Kelsen's view,
international law is merely a superior element and not a structure in itself. Yet,
many other twentieth century international law scholars in their routine analyses
employed the idea of a structure from various dimensions, formally and informally.
Even the notion "system," whereby general international law is linked to the special
branches by way of doctrines, evokes the idea of a structure. Id.
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"elements" being fragments of that whole. Scholars of international
law routinely indulge in discourse, a process which generates a certain
set of values unique to the "whole." This type of rhetoric and its
operation are well articulated by linguists in "critical discourse
analysis," a method which helps one to identify the role of language in
the social process.30 3 Without detailing the role of language in the
social process,30 4 suffice it to say that all postmodern social
architectures, including international law, are constituted by discourse.
A discourse exists in three forms 1) as texts, 2) as discursive practices,
and 3) as social practices.305 Texts are "either written or spoken
discourse" 30 6 which comprise various societal interactions, e.g.,
diplomatic correspondence, telecasts, scholarly rhetoric. Discursive
practice is the method of embedding a text into its context, using
various techniques. 30 7 In social practice, texts are interpreted in terms
of the context and social dynamics are assessed. 30 8 In other words,
"for any discursive event . . . text producers and interpreters draw
upon the socially available resources . "...,,309 A social stir is created
when all three forms of discourse perform a linear operation.
302. The term "units" is used in a rather broad sense to cover everything
(including politics, international organizations, and diplomacy) that international law
maintains by means of linkages to its "whole," special branches being one such unit.
This understanding is gained from David Kennedy's assertion "law is nothing but an
attempt to project a stable relationship between spheres it creates to divide."
Kennedy, supra note 292, at 8.
303. For a seminal work on critical discourse analysis, see generally NORMAN
FAIRCLOUGH, CRITICAL DIscouRSE ANALYSIS: THE CRITICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGE
(1995) (discussing the role language plays in shaping the order of discourse). On
the role of language in the social process, see NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, DisCOURSE
AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1995). For a review of the literature on critical discourse
analysis covering its methodology, range and operation, see Jan Blommaert & Chris
Bulcaen, Critical Discourse Analysis, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 447 (2000).
These works have informed the account presented here, although it does not strictly
adhere to the method in all of its particulars.
304. Readers interested in the role of language in shaping society are directed
to the sources cited supra, note 303.
305. Blommaert & Bulcaen, supra note 303, at 448-49.
306. FAIRCLOUGH, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, supra note 303, at 4.
307. Id. at 10.
308. Blommaert & Bulcaen, supra note 303, at 449.
309. FAIRCLOUGH, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, supra note 303, at 10.
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What generates a discourse? Discourse originates in the mind.
The postmodern mind, however, is not a phenomenon in its own right;
it is, to quote Richard Tamas, "an open-ended, indeterminate set of
attitudes that has been shaped by a great diversity of intellectual and
cultural currents ..... 310 The receptiveness to such diverse attitudes
owes to the mind's subjectivity, which has evolved incrementally
from the level of the cerebrum through the "interaction of organism
and environment." 31' "Interaction" is the mind's reflexivity to certain
signals transmitted by society, dictated by the cortex of the brain.312
In this reflexive process, the mind consistently analyzes the meanings
linked to the social customs and habits embedded in it and, whenever
required, reorganizes those meanings and understandings. 31 3  This
reflexivity and subsequent reorganization are carried out through
language and actions. Here lies the structuring role of discourse. In
practical terms, the linear operation of the three elements of
discourse-texts, discursive practice, and social practice--constitute
interaction.
When actors of international law engage in similar interactions, or
discourse, values are formed. The actors associate the values with
various units, including special branches, again through discourse.
When there is a conflict between units or between a unit and the
whole, the discourse modes reduce conflicting values into harmony 314
although the plurality of values remains, 3 5 both in the whole as well
as among the units. Discourse maintains an axiological harmony.
310. RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND:
UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD VIEW 395 (1991).
311. J.D. Stoops, Society and the Subjective Mind, 44 PHIL. REV. 99, 103
(1935). No analysis of the formation of the subjective mind should overlook the
explanatory power of Freud's psychoanalysis. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE
EGO AND THE ID (James Strachey ed., Joan Riviere trans., rev. ed. 1989).
312. Stoops, supra note 311, at 112.
313. Id.
314. In St. Augustine's philosophy of axiological monism, God acts as the
single value to which all conflicting values can be reduced. See CH. PERELMAN,
THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: ESSAYS ON RHETORIC AND ITS
APPLICATIONS 62-72 (1979). Perelman presents various positions akin to St.
Augustine's, but concludes that philosophical pluralism acts as a safety valve against
"the coercion imposed in the name of a unique value ..... " Id. at 71.
315. On the plurality of values in the traditional international law context, see
Josef L. Kunz, Pluralism of Legal and Value Systems and International Law, 49
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While the far-reaching global changes occurred, scholarly minds
in space law were psychologically committed to the positivist idea of
rules and principles. The reflexive sense of those minds lay dormant
under the weight of doctrines, which were impressed upon them by
the parent structure-international law. Any scope there might have
been for self-criticism was reduced to nothing by certain fixations.
Every time the mind responded to a stimulus, it looked at the parent
structure for a world-view; every signal from society was perceived in
terms of the values held by international law. In effect, there was no
direct interaction between the mind and society where space law was
concerned. At the same time, certain scholars of international law,
who were directly interacting with society, 316 sensed a change in the
patterns of international life. This was followed by an evaluation of
the "self' and the designs of knowledge and structures of international
law, the outcome of which was an ambivalent feeling-one nihilistic
yet self-assured. 3 7  However, the scholarly minds interacted
effectively with the new environment: new methods and patterns of
discourse and ways of working in the discipline were laid down which
inter alia, as elsewhere, recast the relationship between special
branches and international law. In the new scheme, relative autonomy
was granted to special branches with regard to certain functions, e.g.,
framing optimal policies and strategies, setting standards, settling
disputes, and educating students.
If these functions are taken together, space law resembles a closed
group working on its own. However, the new posture failed to
remedy one major handicap in the discipline: if previously it was the
aura of doctrines which blinded the scholarly minds in space law to a
worldview, it is now the autonomy granted by international law that
does so. Interaction with society is nevertheless pursued by the
scholarly minds in international law who dictate the progress of space
law and of other special branches as well. In other words, the
AM. J. INT'L L. 370 (1955).
316. Even then, among the international law scholars, only a fraction who
embraced a multidisciplinary approach had direct interaction with society. The
heavy doctrinal conceptualism left the rest no different than their counterparts in
space law.
317. I owe this view to a general reading of Outi Korhonen, New International
Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
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apparent self-sufficiency of space law is an illusion;318 the space law
group has committed the grave mistake of assessing the ontology of
the discipline on the basis of its illusory autonomy.
B. Comparable Trends: The Law of the Sea, Human Rights Law,
and Environmental Law
The emphasis on the progressive-mindedness of space lawyers is
encouraging. The subsequent assertion of self-sufficiency for the
discipline is also justifiable if one sympathizes with the system of
reasoning to which space law was habituated. However, the sentiment
that the internal robustness and external dynamism of the discipline
constitute a secession from international law is a failure to
comprehend the prescriptions of international law. The approach of
space law is, nevertheless, not the only one of its kind. Cultural
characteristics similar to those of space law can be observed in other
special branches of international law as well. This section concisely
captures the epistemic characteristics of three such special branches-
the law of the sea, human rights, and environmental law-with an
emphasis on the scholarly sensibilities prevailing in them during
postmodernity.3 19
Law of the Sea (LOS)
"The law of the sea is a microcosm of international law," 320 and
has developed parallel to international law. 321 Having been nurtured
by the ethical ingenuities and imaginative flights of reflection of the
natural lawyers, LOS went on to become the subject of the most
comprehensive codification ever seen in international law. The
"Grotian tag" attached to the discipline drew many early aspirants to
choose LOS for developing their understanding of international
318. ILC REPORT, supra note 240.
319. This presentation of the epistemic culture of and scholarly sensibilities in
all three branches of law is not based on a comprehensive review of the scholarly
works in the respective branches. The objective of this section is only to emphasize
certain trends the branches share with space law.
320. M.H. Mendelson, The Flux and Reflux of the Law of the Sea, 5 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 285, 285 (1985).
321. See R.P. ANAND, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 1-9
(1981). However, Anand disputes that the euro-centricism of international law is
also present in the law of the sea. Id.
403
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law. 322 It would not be an overstatement that the expositions of every
medieval scholar of international law have a theoretical reliance upon
LOS. Whereas traditional scholarship on LOS focused on mapping
physical zones of the sea and the pinning of relevant doctrines to those
zones, later scholars focused on legitimacy in the exploration of ocean
resources and navigation. Over a period of four centuries since
Grotius, the discipline imparted meaning to doctrine, ideology, policy,
diplomacy, and litigation in international law.
The conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 marked the victory of diplomacy over
ideology, yet LOS was to plummet to more formidable clashes
between ideology and law. 323  The scholarly omnipresence of
McDougal and his policy jurisprudence was felt in this phase. 324
Within a decade, the rise of free trade and the subsequent alterations
of UNCLOS 32 5 also gave rise to a skeptical scholarship, mostly from
the southern hemisphere. 326 When the free-trading market economy
boomed, maritime activities expanded in tandem with the demands of
the market. In response, LOS was fragmented into specialized
322. For an account of Grotius' perspective on the law of the sea and the
various factors which influenced his writings on the subject, see FRANS DE PAUW,
GROTIUS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1965).
323. This clash and its causes have been effectively articulated in MARKUS G.
SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? (1989). The major protester
against the UNCLOS regime was the United States, whose objection was primarily
based on ideological grounds and "directed against the creation of an 'unaccountable
and self-perpetuating world bureaucracy dedicated to regulating and taxing free
enterprise."' Id. at 307 (quoting William Safire, Essay, A Decent Respect, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1985, at A19). There was also dissatisfaction with the deep seabed
regime. See generally R.P. Anand, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
United States, 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 153 (1984).
324. See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOuGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
(1987) (discussing how the law of the sea is an important part of the overall
decision-making process involved in earth- and space-related law).
325. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994). See also The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Outstanding Issues Relating
on the Law of the Sea, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/48/950 (June
9, 1994).
326. See, e.g., Yogesh Tyagi, Towards UNCLOS IV?, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 143
(1993).
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subdiscplines under stylish labels, e.g., admiralty law (maritime issues
and offenses), shipping law (issues relating to vessels such as carriage
of goods and passengers, ship recycling, etc.), and marine law (to
some extent used synonymously with LOS, although it gives priority
to issues relating to fisheries, pollution, the market, insurance, and so
forth). New outlets-consultancies, NGOs, and law firms-were
opened to provide expertise on marine, admiralty, and shipping-
related issues. However, the most significant spin-off of the new
situation was the heterogeneity in the LOS community; with the entry
of new professionals such as attorneys, ex-sailors, and managers into
the field, lawyers, discussing on and invoking various principles and
precedents of LOS, have become few in number. The research themes
and the nature of texts in the discipline have slanted noticeably
towards applications and strategies in preference to doctrines and
rules.
Traditional LOS scholars are struggling to retain their past glory
within the scholarly community. Issues that were once part of their
domain of analysis are being effectively deliberated and executed by
other professionals; while the conventional scholarly discourse is
caught up in verbosity, "fieldworkers" get to the bottom of issues with
the aid of various organizational models and tools.3 27 However, this
situation cannot be considered a complete seizure by non-legal
professionals, for task allocation to relevant bodies or professional
groups seems to be a workable strategy for developing UNCLOS. 328
327. One issue where this seizure by the non-legal professionals is apparent is
marine pollution. Where most of the scholarly discourse on marine pollution
vacillates over the articulation of the procedural crisis within UNCLOS or
suggestions regarding institutional reform or national concerns, management
professionals devise objective-level projects providing technical support to
implementation operations, e.g., the Decision Support System-a management
strategy to combat oil spills, particularly in coastal areas. See S. Zahra
Pourvakhshouri & Shattri Mansor, Decision Support System in Oil Spill Cases, 12
DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT. 217 (2003) (reviewing the literature on various oil
spill prevention strategies).
328. Alan Boyle has presented various strategies for developing UNCLOS,
e.g., reinterpreting UNCLOS, using soft law mechanisms and regional agreements
for furthering the objectives of UNCLOS, and integration with other multilateral
treaties. Alan Boyle, Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention:
Mechanisms for Change, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 563 (2005). For a case in point
regarding the development of UNCLOS, see Kari Hakapait, Jurisdictional
Developments and the Law of the Sea Convention: Some Observations on Vessel-
405
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If ultimate realization of all schemes is the concern of "somebody
else," what is left for the traditional LOS scholars? Do they not face
an "existential crisis?, 329  Asking such questions is in one sense
committing the same folly as the space lawyers did (who perceived
the autonomy bestowed upon them as liberation from international
law), for allocation of tasks to other professionals corresponds to the
reorganization of international law's internal strategies on the basis of
the scholars' interaction with society; traditional LOS scholars engage
in that interaction. 330 In addition, implementation of every scheme
requires the assistance of scholarly discourse and ratiocination in
perceiving a workable approach
Human Rights Law
Contemporary international lawyers will hesitate before they
assert exclusivity for the discipline of human rights-as will
philosophers, sociologists, and political theorists: heterogeneity is
built into the modem human rights community-scholars, lawyers,
activists, and the media. Scholars of international law started to
discuss human rights under the rubric Human Rights Law (HRL) after
the adoption of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the situation Nagendra Singh positively depicted as the
end of the "Albuquerque age" and the "dawn of a new era for
humanity."' 33' The next three decades of HRL scholarship was that of
Source Pollution, in STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND THE LAW OF MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 277 (S. Mahmoudi & N.H. Nordquist eds., 2003).
329. Martti Koskenniemi, What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl
Marx?, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 229, 230 (2004) (articulating the extent to which
Marxian teachings can help to overcome international lawyers' existential crisis).
"Existential crisis" for Koskennieni is the uncertainty which an international lawyer
feels in the modernist wave and is not strictly limited to the confusion resulting from
the fragmentation within a special branch. Id.
330. A risk is involved here. If a traditional LOS scholar lacks a
multidisciplinary approach and continues to perceive the actions of fieldworkers in
terms of his or her traditional way of reasoning, he or she will develop an
"existential crisis." This frame of mind on the part of the traditional LOS scholar is
likely to generate a feeling of self-sufficiency among the new professionals of the
LOS community.
331. NAGENDRA SINGH, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PEACE & WAR
AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 5 (1986). On the further development of human
rights law, see Theodore S. Orlin & Martin Scheinin, Introduction, in THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATIVE
APPROACH 1, 3-17 (Theodore S. Orlin et al. eds., 2000).
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rational appraisals and critiques of the human rights instruments and
institutions of the UN system. 332 It was an effort to positivize HRL.
In contrast, a parallel scholarship burgeoned in the United States
highlighting the unconstitutionality of the UN's treaty dimension of
human rights: the domestic application of the human rights provisions
of the UN Charter and other instruments prompted scholarly
skepticism towards the authoritarianism of the UN human rights
machinery. 333 Regardless of the divergence in opinion, human rights
lawyers at that time had exclusivity of discourse. In those discourses,
the state-the principal "abuser" as well as "guarantor" of human
rights-was the object of accusations as well as accolade.334 With
globalization, as global interactions intensified, there was a sudden
rise in human rights awareness, resulting in crosscutting human rights,
e.g., the right to development, right to environment, collective rights,
minority rights and women's rights, what Messer classifies as "third
and fourth generation" human rights.335 The exponential increase in
332. See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1973) (discussing the impact of the UN Charter and Bill of Rights on
human rights); John Carey, Progress on Human Rights at the United Nations, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 107 (1972); Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1949); Theodor Meron, Norm Making and
Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 754 (1982); Myres S. McDougal & Gerhard Bebr, Human Rights in
the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1964) (although McDougal and Bebr
considered the UN human rights system a legacy of the great historic movements of
the past, it is far from perfect. They suggested that the United Nations should
"clarify and demonstrate" to the people of the world that the Organization can
provide them with inter alia an opportunity to maximize their own personal values);
Egon Schwelb, International Conventions on Human Rights, 9 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
654 (1960); Louis B. Sohn, United Nations Machinery for Implementing Human
Rights, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 909 (1968); Edgar Turlington, The Human Rights
Commission at the Crossroads, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 534 (1951).
333. See, e.g., E.H.C., The Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
Charter and Their Effect on the Domestic Law of Human Rights, 36 VA. L. REV.
1059 (1950) (highlighting, however, the inviolability of the Charter in concluding
the article).
334. Sumner B. Twiss, History, Human Rights, and Globalization, 32 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHIcs 39, 39 (2004).
335. Ellen Messer has classified human rights on a chronological basis into
four categories: 1) first-generation human rights (civil and political rights),
introduced by the Western nations in the aftermath of World War Two; 2) second-
generation human rights (socio-economic and cultural rights), added by the socialist
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new actors (abusers as well as guarantors) such as transnational
corporations, NGOs, and social movements was another notable
change in the theory and practice of HRL.336
Professional fragmentation and the emergence of new
practitioners struck HRL at this phase, with "cause lawyers" and
"activist-scholars" being the archetypal examples. Cause lawyers
(most activists themselves) work hand in hand with the human rights
monitoring and reporting agencies for the enforcement of rights, 337
whereas scholar-activists engage in interactions with society in order
to enrich their worldview. In this way, they aid the cause lawyers in
their endeavor, since they supposedly have a finer-grained worldview
than generalist HRL scholars: scholar-activists have a higher
perceptivity towards the given social situation, which facilitates a fair
presentation and interpretation of the rights in question. 338  The
situation seems to bear out "Lawrence Freidman's observation that
'law is too important to be left to lawyers."' 339 Does it mean that
conventional HRL scholars/lawyers are inferior in the human rights
community? Or, do they, like LOS scholars, face an existential crisis?
The Herculean image of scholar-activists is somewhat
overemphasized. Having no doubt about their greater perceptivity to
social situations, the genuineness of their worldview is doubtful. Even
while appraising the social relevance and the power of the arguments
of various activist-scholars, one must avoid the projection of their
respective orientation, be it ethnic, political, ideological, or gender-
based.340 The resulting worldview, which is the basis for every further
action by them, will be predisposed towards one or another
states; 3) third-generation human rights (solidarity or development rights), added by
the former colonies of Asia and Africa; and 4) fourth-generation human rights
(indigenous rights), introduced by indigenous peoples. Ellen Messer, Anthropology
and Human Rights, 22 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 221, 222-23 (1993).
336. Twiss, supra note 334, at 50-56 (detailing the emergence and role of each
new actor).
337. On the tasks and work of a cause lawyer, see Lisa Hajjar, Cause
Lawyering in Transnational Perspective: National Conflict and Human Rights in
Israel/Palestine, 31 L. & Soc'Y REv. 473 (1997).
338. For support, see Frank Munger, Inquiry and Activism in Law and Society,
35 L. & Soc'Y REv. 7 (2001) (presenting the orientation and arguments of various
scholar-activists).
339. Id. at 8.
340. See id.
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orientation. Acceptance of all such worldviews coming from different
quarters implies a plurality of worldviews which, in effect,
undermines the universality of human rights established by
international law.341  In sum, law is too important to be left to
activists. However, when interaction with society is left to
conventional generalist HRL scholars, who have a broad frame of
mind, sterilized of any sort of orientations, the resulting worldview is
likely to be less parochial. Yet, considering the relatively higher
perceptive power of scholar-activists, conventional HRL scholars
accept the plurality of worldviews and engage in discourse to bring
coherence to the worldviews fetched by the scholar-activists, thereby
maintaining the universality of human rights. However, if HRL
scholars attempt to bring coherence through their conventional pattern
of thinking, i.e., by threading the worldviews together using doctrines
and rules, it is likely that they will develop a sense of futility in their
task and anguish over their loss of identity; a multidisciplinary critical
outlook and pattern of discourse can overcome such feelings of futility
and anguish.
Environmental Law
In the year 1968, when Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of Commons
exposed the threat that political realism poses to the global
environment, it set in motion a chain of legal controls for the
protection of the environment. 342 At the domestic level, after a grand
legislative exercise-a cost and effect analysis with the principles of
torts343-- certain dimensions of environmental pollution mainly
341. The universality of human rights has been laid down in Article 55 of the
UN Charter and has been reaffirmed in the preamble of the Vienna Declaration on
Human Rights, 1993. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
A/CONF. 157/2 (July 12, 1993).
342. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968). According to Hardin, self-interest or the desire to maximize one's gain
can threaten the existence of a commons, which has limited resources for the
community. Id. The answer to the tragedy, according to David Wilkinson, is
rational use of the commons aided by systems of "self-regulation." See DAVID
WILKINSON, ENVIRONMENT AND LAW 7 (2001).
343. For a brief portrayal of the history of environmental legislation in the
United States, see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4-10 (2007). On the implications of the
environmental legislative boom of the 1970s for various segments of American
society, see PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
409
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required international legislative responses. 344 However, scholars of
international law were concerned over the inadequacy of the existing
international legal order to deal with various environmental issues.
They sought alternative frameworks, e.g., ones within which
"principles from traditional fields of international law can be
combined into a coherent order of 'international environmental law'
[IEL], 345 and "international ecostandards" whereby standards set by
technical experts within the treaty framework regulate environmental
protection.346 Accordingly, IEL, in contrast to other special branches,
diverged from traditional international legal methods although not
from the ambit of the doctrines of international law per se. 347
In the 1980s, when scholars conclusively agreed that there existed
(at least latent) "relative normativity" in international law, 348 IEL,
impoverished due to the "modesty" of international law principles 349
and benumbed by the decentralized nature of the international legal
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 121-39 (2003).
344. For example, according to Alexandre Kiss, transboundary pollution and
pollution of the interrelated components of the natural environment such as oceans,
air, and international rivers require international legislative action. Alexandre Kiss,
The International Protection of Environment, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1069, 1069-87 (R. St. J. Macdonald & D.M. Johnston eds.,
1986).
345. Note, New Perspectives on International Environmental Law, 82 YALE
L.J. 1659, 1660 (1973).
346. Paolo Contini & Peter H. Sand, Methods to Expedite Environmental
Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1972).
347. For example, Gunther Handl had emphasized the applicability of the
principle of territorial sovereignty with regard to transboundary pollution. See
Gunther Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution,
69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975). He attempted to analyze the extent to which a claim
made by a state against the transboundary pollution caused to its territory by another
state while performing an activity that is lawful per se can be sustained on the
grounds of violation of sovereignty. He affirmatively concludes that existence of
material damage to the state or its populace can sustain such a claim. Id.
348. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
349. Ian Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of
Environmental Protection, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1-11 (Ludwik
A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974). Brownlie characterizes customary
international law in the absence of any institutions as "modest," analyzes the
principle of state responsibility in environmental issues. Id.
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system, found in the legislative convenience of the secondary forms of
normativity, e.g., "soft law," a prospect for its development and
effectiveness. The resulting innovativeness in environmental
lawmaking "ultimately constitut[ed] a powerful factor pushing
forward towards a transformation of the fundamental basis of
international law." 350 This mechanical utility of environmental law
situated it within the structure of international law.
However, in the postmodern era, IEL used its much hyped
methodological innovation to slip away from the frontiers of
international law. The postmodern era, according to Tuomas
Kuokkanen, for IEL "is marked by an increased reliance on technical
expertise, recognition of the ambivalent... relationship between man
and nature, the integration of fields previously considered separate,
and the balancing of economic interest and environmental
concerns."
351
In other words, a dramatic increase in environmental
consciousness, the use of interdisciplinary optics to appraise
environmental policies and regulation 352 and a strategy- and
management-oriented approach towards environmental problems353
signaled the move to postmodernity. In a profoundly integrated
(postmodern) world driven by economic ideologies, environmental
matters assumed a materialistic dimension and environmental
protection, in particular, embraced an objective approach. New
strategies and multi-expert systems compatible with the new situation,
e.g., Environmental Impact Assessment, bid every environmental
professional to toe the line, and international lawyers judiciously rose
to the occasion with a new sense of self-identity and a reformulated
350. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 2 (1991).
351. TuoMAs KUOKKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
VARIATIONS ON A THEME xxix (2002).
352. Although synergy with science is generally put forward as the case in
question, the relevance of other branches of knowledge, for instance, philosophy, in
interpreting and shaping environmental policies, strategies, and regulations cannot
be overlooked. See JOSEPH R. DES JARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2001) (providing insights
into how far philosophy can guide in the formulation of methods and decision
making concerning environment).
353. KUOKKANEN, supra note 351, at 261-86 (presenting a larger management
framework under the rubric "environmental governance").
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plan of action. They, in addition to performing specialist functions,
employed state-of-the-art methods within the traditional international
law frameworks, 354 e.g., strategizing and managing within the climate
change regime. 355  On balance, the situation resembled an
advantageous purchase in the face of losing their professional
exclusivity in environmental protection.
C. Methodological Summary and Conclusion
In this counter-defense, international law, while concurring with
the overall streamlining of space law, refuted the latter's claim of
being severed from international law on the grounds that the
streamlining has been designed only by the scholars of international
law. This is the primary belief (A). The presentation of the epistemic
culture of the three branches of international law set out the sub-
beliefs (B). However, in this context, it is only the coherent
understanding of the attitudes and mores of the scholars of all three of
these branches of international law that supports the primary belief
and not that of a single branch in isolation. This is apparent from the
dissimilar response and adaptations made by the scholars in each
branch; while scholars of LOS and HRL retreated from certain
specialist roles and committed themselves solely to the task of
sustaining and building normativity through societal interaction, IEL
scholars traversed the complexities of postmodernity by expanding
their knowledge bases and skills. A collective assessment makes
obvious the postmodern challenges faced by these branches of law.
The commonality between the internal dynamics of these branches of
international law and that of space law supports the primary belief as
to the defining role of international law.
354. However, Bodansky asserts that "the distinctive characteristics of
international environmental problems" do not even require international
environmental lawyers to be international lawyers. See Daniel Bodansky, Does One
Need to Be an International Lawyer to Be an International Environmental Lawyer?,
100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 303, 306 (2006).
355. For a comprehensive account of the structure and functioning of the
climate change regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and its Kyoto Protocol, see FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEDURES (2004).
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V. CONCLUSION
Having thus far justified the respective beliefs, space law and
international law now stand ready for a relative evaluation of the
justifications in terms of reality. Reality in the present methodology is
to be ascertained within the frame of a descriptive coherence, i.e., a
belief or judgment is true when "its content embraces, or at least
belongs to, the one coherent system of the world. 356 Although the
article earlier hinted at the difficulty in ascertaining a preconceived
reality, a coherent system of order materialized from the arguments of
both sides. The coherence is that opinions from both sides converge
on the vicissitudes of the world order (even though both sides are
programmed to debate contradicting hypotheses or beliefs), e.g., the
impact of postmodernity on space law and international law has been
verified as corresponding to one another logically. To illustrate, the
contentions of space law predicated on its "progressive sensibility"
have been vouched for by international law as being in accordance
with the script it has for its special branches in a new world order.
Hence the point of convergence of opinions is the idea of an inevitably
changing world, which constitutes the reality. Accordingly, the
weight of the arguments of both sides can be gauged on the basis of
the extent of coherence an argument has with the idea of an inevitably
changing world. In other words, any argument which is irreconcilable
within the structure of postmodernism can be dismissed.
Once we subtract the points of convergence from the whole set of
arguments made by both sides, what remains is space law's assertion
regarding its disjunction from international law and its resulting
feeling of self-sufficiency. It is the only assertion which international
law has chosen to oppose. Therefore, an assessment of the truth
centers on this point of divergence.
For space law, disjunction from the structural complex of
international law is a rational action, as space law is cynical about the
reliability of international law given the latter's disorganized state-a
postmodern phenomenon. The disjunction-a postmodern response-
was carried out through a decomposition technique, which separated
various elements of space law, e.g., profession, education, episteme,




Sreejith: Whither International Law, Thither Space Law: A Discipline in Tra
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
414 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
and working methods, from any significant influence of international
law and conferred a new meaning on them. However, as convincing
as the idea of the "progressive mindedness" of space law is, the notion
of severance from international law is equivalently weak. There is
little doubt that postmodernism has a fragmentatory nature, but it is
also true that a fragmented subject has the capability of "self-
management. 357  On this point, space law gains merit. However,
self-management is one among the many features of an iceberg-like
phenomenon; it would be folly to generalize about postmodernism on
the basis of a single feature. Although it progresses with diverse and
inexplicable techniques, postmodernism has a functional property
common to those techniques, one example being the "spoke structure"
of intersecting circles depicting social life in a postmodern world.358
The spokes link every interconnected sphere to a center, which can be
a value system or a conglomeration of beliefs. Postmodernism adopts
this basic character in its "regime-building" process. To understand
the real architecture and functioning of the spoked structure, the
interpreter should have an interdisciplinary approach; a
monodisciplinary outlook can only reveal visions of one's own realm
and its peripheries; neither the center nor the spokes, which connect
the center to the realm, will be visible.
Space law committed the folly of judging postmodernism through
a myopic eye, failing to see beyond the changes in its realm, and
decided that it had detached itself from international law-the center.
However, as pointed out in the counter-defense, such a mind-set can
be found in other branches of international law as well. In addition,
the feeling of self-sufficiency among the special branches of
international law has been aggravated by a group of scholars who in
an orthodox fashion adhere to the traditional international law
framework. The plight of this group has, however, been hinted at the
counter-defense in the examples of LOS, HRL, and IEL. It is a group
which advances with its old techniques of reasoning totally unaware
357. Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements,
26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 697, 701 (1992). Handler highlights the self-managing capacity
of fragmented subjects in the context of postmodern politics. Id.
358. See Bernice A. Pescosolido & Beth A. Rubin, The Web of Group
Affiliations Revisited: Social Life, Postmodernism, and Sociology, 65 AM. Soc. REv.
52, 62-66 (2000). For a diagrammatic representation of the spoke structure, see Fig.
3, id. at 63.
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of global realities. Even if aware, they prefer silent adherence, fearful
of undermining traditional foundations and ostracism from the
scholarly community. 359  The group persists in building concept
structures with traditional tools and reading the social meanings of
such structures through the traditional lens. The process results in
attributing strange meanings to postmodern actions, which culminates
in a sense of dysphoria and a severe identity crisis among the
members of the group. Members of the group who are aware that
international law has been fragmented believe that an assemblage of
the fragments can overcome any postmodern challenge. 360
The renewalist program of international law, initiated by the
Newstreamers, designed new working methods and patterns of
thinking. Their scheme has a system of channeling the constant
fluctuations of society directly to the scholarly mind, which through
discourse keeps the discipline up to the requirements of
postmodernity. The Newstream program of reawakening the mind to
the reality that society is constitutive of the mind itself36 assimilates
the real pulse of postmodernity. When manifest as discourse, the
constitutive power of the mind, structures and deconstructs, unites and
disunites, coheres and incoheres the various values of postmodern
international law.
While the overall balance between the justifications and the
derived reality tilts in favor of international law, space law cannot be
indicted for any serious misrepresentation of the facts. It can certainly
claim to have a progressive sensibility, for the discipline responded
constructively to the calls of postmodemity thanks to the built-in
survival mechanism present in every branch of law. However, the use
of wrong patterns of thinking and obsolete concepts, fueled by the
existence of a mainstream that lacked an identity, produced a mistaken
feeling of self-sufficiency and independence within the discipline.
The article has accomplished five objectives. First, it has
provided a theoretical account of the theory and practice of space law,
359. Korhonen, supra note 317, at 15.
360. This is the view of the critics of postmodernism. See Steven L. Winter,
For What It's Worth, 26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 789, 791 (1992) (highlighting the
contradiction in a critic's address).
361. See Philip Allott, Reconstituting Humanity: New International Law, 3
EUR. J. INT'L L. 219 (1992) (articulating humankind's changing perceptions of
reality towards the world).
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a discipline about which little has been studied philosophically. The
lack of philosophical criticism has doomed every effort to regulate
space activities to be guided by defective normative conceptions,
resulting in an overemphasis on archaic instruments, neglect of certain
intellectual movements and failing visions. By providing a critique of
space law, the article exposed certain weaknesses of the system which
have been obscured by the panegyrics of a certain group. However,
the debate format of the article dispelled many of the criticisms as
being unsustainable and attempted to strike a fair balance between the
critique and the reality.
Second, a supra-doctrinal approach to space law was taken, in
view of the fact that doctrines are ill-suited tools for clarifying the
ontology of a discipline that has existed as a matter of pride and
tradition. Hence, while criticizing and justifying beliefs, the article
used a logic and vocabulary free from any doctrinal influence. The
approach has broken the shell of the ignorant bliss within which the
discipline rested, revealing its dilemma in the tumult of
postmodernity, and signaling the need to guide the discipline towards
a new world order.
Third, the article endeavored to view the fragmentation of
international law through the eyes of space law, a fragmented regime.
Examining fragmentation has not been the primary objective of the
article, but was included given its significance in situating a discipline
within postmodernism; it gave the reader an "inverse perspective" on
the phenomenon-a sensory illusion that he or she was evaluating
fragmentation, while he or she was in fact evaluating only the
mechanics of space law362 and international law's resistance to the
contentions of space law. 363 In the process, the article observed that
fragmentation is not a negative phenomenon but an important
development in the renewalist program of international law.
However, doctrines no longer have a harmonizing effect on
international law.
Fourth, by having McDougal debate with Jenks, the article
situated a grand intellectual scheme, otherwise loosely hanging in
space law, within the socio-epistemic history of the discipline.
362. See supra Part III.
363. See supra Part IV.
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Fifth, and finally, the article is the second in a series of critical
studies on space law, 364 the central objective of which is "to lead the
discipline into the new world order by preventing it from becoming no
more than a relic for the archeology of international law" and to set
out an alternative vision which considers the universe as an amalgam
of human consciousnesses and which transcends the contemporary
society-oriented perspectives on the use and exploration of space.
364. For the introduction to this series, see Sreejith, supra note 61.
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